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Abstract:   This paper looks at Bulgaria’s industrial restructuring through the lenses of its 
evolving specialization in international division of labor and integration into international markets 
with a special emphasis on EU markets. Its major findings can be summarized as follows: (i) 
Developments in Bulgaria’s exports, its major drivers and factor content, during the ‘second 
transition’ following the 1996 crisis have become reminiscent of developments in the early 1990s 
in European transition economies that have stayed the reform course. (ii) Evolution of Bulgaria’s 
total exports in terms of factor intensities before the ‘second transformational’ recession was a 
testimony to aborted economic reforms. It not only defied expectations derived from the 
experience of CEEC-10 economies and its production factor endowments but also dramatically 
increased the cost of adjustment to market conditions for the economy as a whole. (iii) Exports of 
unskilled labor intensive products continue towering over other exports even during the current 
expansionary phase. The composition of top performers in EU markets indicates, however, the 
shift toward natural resource and capital intensive products. Bulgaria’s export offer in EU 
markets has budged toward more processed goods, mostly products of electro-engineering 
sectors. Subsequently, Bulgarian producers have made some strides in information 
communication technology products and automotive parts. Trade in parts and engineering 
products has also displayed strong growth. 
The returns usually associated with liberal reforms, i.e., gains in competitiveness combined with a 
shift toward products in line with the country’s endowments in production factors began to 
surface only recently. In contrast to the period preceding the second transformational recession, 
gains in competitiveness derive from corporate and industrial restructuring and not from 
subsidies. 
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1. Introduction 
Successfully competing in the global marketplace is crucial to sustained economic 
growth and poverty reduction. It requires macrostability, exposure to competition from imports, 
investment in infrastructure and cutting down production and transaction costs. The latter, 
synonymous with business climate, demand cracking down on corruption and cutting down red 
tape. Unshackling entrepreneurs from excessive bureaucratic restraints grants them the potential 
to increase their exports in sectors where they have competitive strength. 
The experience of transition economies that have successfully taken advantage of 
opportunities offered by pan-European markets suggests that good institutions and policies 
combined with macrostability have to be in place. How can these elements be put in place? The 
first step is a successful implementation of first-generation reforms (liberalization of prices, 
foreign trade and exchange regimes). The second step entails an unwavering movement towards a 
rule-based institutional regime together with the development of state enforcement capacity. The 
former is relatively easy to implement, provided absence of political opposition, whereas the 
latter requires advanced institutional capacity of the state.  
While Bulgaria moved swiftly in implementing first-generation reforms already in 1991 
(Bruno 1994), the initial bold program of dismantling central planning and overcoming 
transformational recession had been quickly aborted distorted with the re-introduction of central 
controls.
1 To make things worse, progress towards creating institutional conditions conducive to 
development driven by private entrepreneurial dynamism has been uneven since the collapse of 
central planning in 1989-90. It appears that weaknesses in state capacity combined with state’s 
capture by private interests groups stood in the way of moving fast in structural reforms until the 
1996 financial collapse. Its consequence was another transformational recession, with two 
consecutive years, 1996 and 1997, of falling aggregate output. Bulgaria, together with Romania 
and Moldova, are the only transition economies that experienced the second transformational 
recession, i.e., at least two consecutive years of contracting aggregate output.
2 
Hence, the real transition to competitive markets began only in 1997. In contrast to the 
first aborted transition, however, the conditions under which the second stabilization program was 
launched in 1997 were much more adverse and demanding than the ones accompanying the first 
stabilization program in 1991. For one, almost half decade of mismanagement wiped away 
financial sector and led to a massive stripping of assets of state owned firms. Many state-owned 
firms, which five years earlier might have been successfully privatized, lost attraction to potential 
investors, foreign and domestic alike. Furthermore, human capital skills that were still available 
in the early 1996 either disappeared due to migration or were simply depleted because of lack of 
employment opportunities.  
In consequence, it took much longer for the usual returns from macrostability, 
privatization and liberalizing structural reforms to materialize. Delayed—almost a decade into 
transition—structural reforms combined with historically high dependence on ‘socialist trade’ had 
deeply affected Bulgaria’s path of restructuring and integrating into world markets. While 
initially Bulgaria progress away from central planning appeared to be similar in terms of 
macroeconomic and export performance to that of other bold reformers, the differences surfaced 
rather dramatically during and immediately after the second transformational recession. The 
abolition of state monopoly over foreign trade combined with the collapse of ‘socialist markets’ 
                                                           
1 For in-depth analysis of Bulgaria’s reform record, see Kaminski (2005) and Wyzan (1998). 
2 Technically, the Czech economy also experienced two consecutive years of falling aggregate output in 
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single year by Bulgaria, Moldova or Romania.   -  5  -     
initially resulted in impressive reorientation of exports, albeit from very low levels, to EU 
markets. However, stagnation replaced initial growth in 1996-99. Had it not been for the rapid 
expansion of clothing exports under the EU-driven outward processing, total exports would have 
significantly contracted. But in the most recent period, especially 2002-03, other products 
emerged as the levers of export growth. This indicates that liberalization measures have led to 
industrial and corporate restructuring and are beginning to pay off in terms of competitive gains 
in international markets.  
While an unfinished reform of the economic regime, derailed until the 1996 financial 
crisis, was responsible for lackluster foreign trade performance, the 2000-2004 period witnessed 
improvements in export performance indicating that with unavoidable delay liberal reforms have 
activated some creative restructuring. In fact, there are three reasons for optimism. First, although 
one might have expected a stronger rebound in Bulgaria’s exports after a contraction in 1998-99, 
current performance points to a significant improvement in the ability of Bulgarian producers to 
withstand competitive pressures in global markets. This refers also to their competitiveness in a 
single European market for industrial products. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the largest 
increases occurred in 2002 and 2003. The rates of export growth of 12 percent and 31 percent 
respectively, albeit the latter ‘tainted’ by  coincided with the significant increase in intensity of 
competition in preferential markets due to the removal of all tariffs on industrial products among 
signatories of the Pan-European Cumulation of Origin Agreement.
3  
Second, progress in implementation of structural reforms and converging to the EU 
“acquis communautaire” has led to a significant enhancement in the quality of domestic business 
climate, which augurs well for future trade performance. The European Commission declared 
Bulgaria a fully functioning market economy in 2003, and accession negotiations were 
successfully completed on June 15, 2004.  
Last but not least, there has been a significant increase in FDI inflows accounting on 
average for around 8 percent of the GDP over 2000-2003. The earlier experience of other 
transition economies indicates that they had led to export expansion driven mainly by skilled 
labor and capital intensive products. There are indications that this change has been taking place 
in Bulgaria’s exports, albeit clothing and footwear still dominate its export basket.  
Hence, thanks to structural reforms and liberal regional trading environment, Bulgaria 
has successfully, albeit only belatedly, begun taking advantage of opportunities offered by 
participation in the EU-driven Eastern Enlargement regional integration project.  
This paper looks at Bulgaria’s industrial restructuring through the lenses of its evolving 
specialization in international division of labor and integration into international markets with a 
special emphasis on EU markets. Its major findings can be summarized as follows: 
•  Developments in Bulgaria’s exports, its major drivers and factor content, during the 
‘second transition’ following the 1996 crisis have become reminiscent of developments 
in the early 1990s in European transition economies that have stayed the reform course. 
•  Evolution of Bulgaria’s total exports in terms of factor intensities before the ‘second 
transformational’ recession was a testimony to aborted economic reforms. It not only 
defied expectations derived from the experience of CEEC-10 economies and its 
production factor endowments but also dramatically increased the cost of adjustment to 
market conditions for the economy as a whole. 
•  Exports of unskilled labor intensive products continue towering over other exports even 
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during the current expansionary phase. But there are several indications heralding change 
underway: 
9  The composition of top performers in EU markets (with an increase in EU imports of 
at least 2.85 times between 2000 and 2003), accounting for 16 percent of Bulgaria’s 
EU-oriented exports in 2003 up from 4 percent in 2000, indicates the shift towards 
natural resource and capital intensive products.  
9  Bulgaria’s export offer in EU markets has shifted towards more processed goods 
mostly products of electro-engineering sectors. 
9  Although Bulgarian producers are not yet become on any significant scale of the 
division of labor based on production fragmentation in vertically integrated sectors, 
they have made significant strides in information communication technology 
products and automotive parts. 
9  Last but not least, trade in parts and engineering products not covered by the network 
trade analysis has displayed strong growth, with their exports accounting in 2003 for 
5.4 percent of Bulgaria’s EU-oriented exports up from 3.1 percent in 1998. 
•  The returns usually associated with liberal reforms, i.e., gains in competitiveness 
combined with shift towards in products in line with country’s endowments in production 
factors began to surface only recently. In contrast to the period preceding the second 
transformational recession, gains in competitiveness derive from corporate and industrial 
restructuring and not from subsidies. 
2.  Highlights of Bulgaria’s trade performance: dynamics and geographical 
reorientation 
What are the major characteristics of Bulgaria’s overall performance? How does it 
compare to other regional partners? What are its idiosyncratic features? These are the main 
questions addressed in this section.  
A. Trade in goods and services: three phases 
Looking solely at the dynamics of Bulgaria’s foreign trade over 1990-2004, one may 
distinguish three distinct phases. The first phase of hesitant recovery, covering the period in the 
aftermath of the collapse of central planning in 1989-90 until 1995, was characterized by a slow 
growth in the value of both exports and imports. The value of total trade increased 60 percent 
between 1991 and 1995, with a caveat—balance of payments statistics for this period are hardly 
reliable. Trade in services, which increased more than threefold, contributed significantly to the 
increase, as trade in goods increased only 40 percent during this period (Table 1).  
The beginning of the second phase of stagnation, if not contraction, coincides with the 
eruption of financial crisis in 1996 and ends in 1999. Within this second phase, the deep 
macroeconomic crisis that brought the economy to a grinding halt in 1996-97 affected foreign 
trade in perverse ways. While in 1996 both the values of exports and imports contracted, the 
former increased in 1997 (Table 1). This led to a very significant surplus in foreign trade, with the 
value of exports of goods and services 20 percent higher than their imports. Surpluses 
disappeared in both 1998 and 1999, as exports were contracting and imports increased in both 
years.
4 In consequence, in 1996 total foreign trade in goods and services fell more than the 
GDP—in 1995 the ratio fell from 137 percent to 97 percent in 1996. Subsequently, the foreign 
trade contracted less than the GDP in 1997 and grew faster in 1998. In 1999, when the GDP 
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much more. In consequence, the total trade declined in 1997 marking the beginning of the stagnation and 
contraction in Bulgaria’s foreign trade.   -  7  -     
registered healthy growth after two years of contraction, total trade—due to the decline in the 
value of exports—contracted in terms of their share in the GDP.  
Table 1; Developments in trade in goods and services in 1992-2003 (in millions of current US dollars) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Exports of goods and 
services  4,137 5,026 4,898 5,192 6,738 6,608 7,011 5,981 5,795 7,000  7,539  8,286 10,590
of  which:  services  400 1,070 1,172 1,257 1,771 1,919 2,202 1,788 1,788 2,175  2,426  2,594 3,115
Imports of goods 
(fob) and services  4,255 5,334 5,841 5,198 6,636 6,152 5,845 5,989 6,562 7,670  8,575  9,287 12,151
Of  which:  services  486 1,165 1,229 1,246 1,706 1,585 1,357 1,415 1,474 1,670  1,882  2,000 2,439
Balance in total trade  -118  -308  -943 -6 102 456 1,166 -8 -767 -670  -1,036  -1,001 -1,561
In  goods  -32 -213 -886 -17 37 122 321 -381 -1,081 -1,175  -1,580  -1,595 -2,237
In  services -86 -95 -57 11 65 334 845 373 314 505  544  594 676
Exports of goods and 
services as percent of 
their imports 
97.2 94.2 83.9 99.9 101.5 107.4 120.0 99.9 88.3 91.3 87.9 89.2 87.2
Exports of goods as 
percent of their 
imports 
99.1 94.9 80.8 99.6 100.8 102.7 107.2 91.7 78.8 80.4 76.4 78.1 77.0
Share of services in 
exports  9.7 21.3 23.9 24.2 26.3 29.0 31.4 29.9 30.9 31.1  32.2  31.3 29.4
Total trade in goods 
and services in GDP  76.7 94.7  103.5 95.9 136.7 97.4 129.8 115.4 97.0 113.2 127.8 129.3 146.8
Source: Bulgarian authorities and Fund staff estimates. 
Yet, in retrospect, the contraction in exports of goods in 1999, triggered by long delayed 
industrial restructuring, set the stage for a strong recovery phase that began a year later. An 
indication of restructuring was the growth in imports of machinery. Their share in total imports 
increased from 14 percent of total imports in 1997 to 16 percent in 1998 and jumped to 21 percent 
in 1999.
5 Year 2000 witnessed a turnaround in both exports and imports. Since 2000 trade in 
goods and services has expanded faster than the GDP, reversing the developments in 1996 and 
1998-99. 
Notwithstanding low reliability of data on trade in services, usually underreported in 
most balance of payments statistics, services appear to have been a bright spot in Bulgaria’s 
external performance. First, it has been a net foreign currency earner, with the surplus reaching 
US$ 676 million in 2003. Except for a short period in 1995-1997 coinciding with the 1996-97 
financial melt-down, Bulgaria ran a deficit in its trade in goods and services. Exports of goods as 
percent of their imports have been at slightly below 80 percent since 1999.  
Second, in contrast to exports of goods, the contraction in exports of services during the 
1996-99 crisis phase was much smaller and extended over a shorter period of only two years, that 
is, 1996 and 1997. They began rebounding in 1998, but they exceeded the pre-crisis level only in 
2001. The share of services in Bulgaria’s total exports of goods and services increased from 22 
percent in 1996 to 30 percent in 2003, with the share of travel in foreign exchange receipts from 
services growing from 28 percent to 52 percent over this period.  
Yet, there is still a significant untapped potential to increase earnings in the future. The 
IMF projects strong growth of exports of services over 2004-06 mainly due to tourism revenues. 
It predicts a 24 percent growth in exports of travel services in 2004 and a ten-percent increase in 
2005 (IMF 2004).  
Another reason for optimism relates to current and future exports of computer services. 
While the quality of statistics is particularly poor in this sector, simply because cross-border 
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supplies of these services tend to be beyond government’s control, there are some indications 
pointing to a healthy growth of software exports mainly to the EU and U.S. According to one 
estimate and anecdotal evidence, around 80 percent of Bulgaria’s software output of estimated at 
around US$ 400 million, or around US$ 340 million, is sold abroad.
6 Since the total value of 
‘other services’ sold abroad was US$ 565 million in 2003, it is rather unlikely that this fully 
accounts for the contribution of the software sector. According to the same source, these exports 
are expected to grow at around 30 percent per year over the next several years. 
B. Performance: exports of goods in comparative perspective 
Bulgaria stands out among CEEC-10 economies as the worst performer in terms of 
exports of goods. No other CEEC-10 economy has experienced such a volatile export 
performance and such deep contraction not only immediately after the collapse of central 
planning but also several years into transition. Bulgaria’s time profile makes it more comparable 
to CIS economies rather than to CEEC-8 but only in its performance through early 1990’s. It 
became comparable to that of CEEC-8 economies experienced during their early stages of 
transition only 6-7 years later around 1997. 
Bulgaria’s overall performance in 1991-95 appeared to be in line with that of other 
Central European economies. Data in Figure 1 for two countries, Hungary and Romania with total 
exports (US$ 5.2 billion and US$ 4.9 billion) roughly twice as large as total exports of Bulgaria 
(US$ 2.3 billion) in 1993, provide vivid illustration of distinctive features of Bulgaria’s export 
performance.
7 The differences in dynamics were enormous. By 2004 Hungary’s total exports 
stood at 179 percent of Romania’s exports and 442 percent of Bulgaria’s, while Romania’s at 246 
percent of Bulgaria’s exports.  
Figure 1: Total exports of goods of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in 1993-2003 (in millions of US 
dollars) 
 
Source: Derived from the IMF Direction of Trade statistics.   
While the value of Bulgaria’s exports increased 125 percent between 1991 and 1995 as 
compared to Hungary’s 56 percent and Romania’s 62 percent, the recovery from a 
transformational recession turned out to be short-lived. There was a dramatic reversal of fortunes 
in 1996-99, with total exports in terms of value falling every year during this period. The largest 
contraction of almost 10 percent was in 1997. While the value of Bulgaria’s total exports in 1999 
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7 Note that the data used in Figure 1 differ from those in Table 1, as they are derived not from the balance 
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stood at 72 percent of their 1995 value, Romania stood at 107 percent and Hungary’s exports 
skyrocketed to 236 percent of their 1995 level.  
Although in 2000-03 the time profile of developments in exports of these countries has 
become roughly similar, with Bulgaria’s growth on par with that of Hungary and below that of 
Romania, the losses incurred in 1992-96 turned out to be very difficult to recover. Romania’s 
export growth during the 1999-2003 was much stronger than that of Bulgaria. The gap between 
these two countries has been increasing in favor of Romania every year since 1995. During 
Romania’s recent expansionary period over 1999-2003, Romanian exports recorded the third 
fastest growth among European transition economies.
8 
The differences between three countries stem from differences in economic policies. 
Hungary, which consistently stayed the reform course, outperformed both Bulgaria and Romania. 
While there were not significant differences in approach taken initially to economic reforms, 
Bulgaria had a clear disadvantage, i.e., huge sovereign debt incurred before the collapse of central 
planning. In addition, it had looser macroeconomic policies and state owned enterprises had 
easier access to bank credits.  
The seeds of subsequent economic collapse of Bulgaria in 1996, planted several years 
earlier, were apparent in three important features in Bulgaria’s export performance prior to the 
crisis that set it apart from Central European radical reformers. First, exports to the EU 
contributed much less to overall export recovery than in CEEC-3 economies (see Section 2.C 
below). Second, different products in terms of factor intensities drove the overall export recovery. 
Last but not least, Bulgaria’s export performance turned out to be non-sustainable over a longer 
period of time, as exports collapsed in 1996 setting Bulgaria apart not only from CEEC-3 
countries, but also Romania.  
The reasons for the collapse were rooted in aborted first-generation reform measures and 
the absence of structural, second-generation reforms. More specifically, the failure to introduce 
hard-budget constraint on SOEs combined with various schemes of privatizing stream of benefits 
from state-owned assets has led to the meltdown of the banking sector and the collapse of the 
economy. Consider first that the Bulgarian ‘melt-down’ in 1996-97 cannot be explained by 
historically high dependence on ‘socialist trade.’ For instance, Baltic States were more dependent 
on this trade than Bulgaria and experienced higher decline in output (Table 2). But none of them 
experienced the second transformational recession, as all the contraction occurred during the 
period following immediately the demise of central planning.  
Although there appears to be a strong positive correlation between the size of contraction 
in output and the share of CMEA exports before the demise of the CMEA, the “pre-transition” 
level of dependence on socialist markets fails to explain considerable variation in output decline 
among CEEC-10. This seems to suggest that policies did play an important role. Consider the 
following. Despite its low level of trade with CMEA countries in 1989, the contraction in 
Romania’s output was higher than that of several other CEECs (e.g., Hungary and Poland) with 
much higher exposure to CMEA markets. Bulgaria registered similar contraction in output as 
Estonia, albeit the latter was much more heavily depended on socialist trade. Hence, reforms and 
good policies appear to have weakened the negative impact of initial conditions. 
Yet, their absence raised the cost of adjustment. Consider first that higher level of 
dependence on trade with CMEA suggest that a much larger share of industrial output would face 
more challenging conditions of switching sales to ‘real’ fully contestable world markets. Second, 
the absence of shift to hard budget constraint was bound to create not only rapidly expanding 
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contingent macroeconomic liabilities but also incentives to managers to strip assets and design 
schemes to ‘privatize’ income from state-owned assets. Therefore, delays in implementing hard 
budget constraints and in privatization further eroded potential value of assets and dramatically 
raised the cost of transition from central planning in Bulgaria.  
Table 2: The collapse of output and dependence on “socialist trade” 
  Last year in which output fell Cumulative output 
decline since 1990 
The share of CMEA exports (or inter-
republic) in total exports in 1989
4/ 
Bulgaria 1997  41  53 
Czech Republic
1/ 1998  16  37 
Estonia 
3/ 1999  52  98 
Hungary 1993  19  41 
Latvia
3/ 1995  57  97 
Lithuania
3/ 1999  55  94 
Poland 1991  14  41 
Romania 1999  39  25 
Slovak Republic
1/ 1993  27  37 
Slovenia 
2/ 1992  22  37 
Notes: 
1/ the share of CMEA –oriented exports is for former Czechoslovakia in 1989. 
2/ the combined share of exports to CMEA and Yugoslav republics in 1992. 
3/ the share of exports to former Soviet republics in 1990. 
4/ The respective shares were re-calculated using Hungarian exchange rate for transferable ruble because the Hungarian 
rate better reflected the purchasing power of the transferable ruble than rates used by other CMEA partners (See 
Kaminski, Wang, Winters 1996). 
Source:  Fischer and Sahay (2000), Kaminski, Wang and Winters (1996), and WB 2005. 
The most powerful indication that the failure of economic policies in 1990-96 to remove 
administrative barriers to allocation of resources and to introduce hard budget constraint on firms, 
mainly state owned, 
9 explains Bulgaria’s unique pattern of export performance in that period 
relates to factor content of its exports.
 In contrast to factor intensities of Hungarian or Polish 
exports, capital intensive and skilled labor intensive products drove Bulgarian exports. While one 
would expect that—like first in Hungarian and subsequently in Polish exports—these products 
would become levers of the export growth, as this would be in line with their comparative 
advantage, this could not have occurred without prior industrial restructuring. In the case of 
Bulgaria, the bulk of exports in 1991-96 continued coming from state-owned firms. Their share in 
total output of industry in 1995 was still 88 percent. Operating at a loss, some of the state-owned 
firms were able to offer prices low enough to be competitive on the international markets. 
Subsidies facilitated competing through prices rather than quality. This explains why, in contrast 
to Bulgaria’s endowments and available production assets poorly matching market imperatives, 
skilled labor and capital intensive experienced initially the fastest growth in EU-oriented exports. 
While in Hungary and Poland large chunks of industry, deprived of subsidies and “easy” markets 
at home, faced extinction or restructuring, there were no similar pressures in Bulgaria.  
The loss in competitiveness vis-à-vis its regional partners, as a result of misguided 
economic policies in 1991-96, was very significant. Bulgaria’s share in total exports of CEEC-11, 
i.e., European transition economies that either acceded or are on the accession path to the EU, fell 
from 5 percent in 1996 to 3 percent in 1999. Significant improvement in Bulgaria’s performance 
has not been sufficient to allow for the increase in its share in total exports of not only CEEC-11 
but also CEEC-3 (Table 3). Bulgaria has succeeded, however, to expand at the same pace as other 
countries of the Balkan Stability Pact (see notes to Table 3).  
                                                           
9 Major measures of first-stage reforms were not only overturned but also no structural, second-stage reforms followed. 
Price liberalization was partly reversed and—with the capture of economic policy by powerful private vested 
interests—privatization program of large state-owned enterprises suspended. For a review of Bulgaria’s decade of 
transition, see Mihov (1999). For an analysis of the 1996 crisis, see Dobrinsky (1997) and Wyzan (1998).    -  11  -     
Table 3: Share of Bulgaria’s exports of goods in total exports of regional groupings: CEEC-11, CEEC-3 
and Stability Pact economies in 1996-2004 (in percent and millions of US dollars)   
    Index, 1999 Index, 2003
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1996=100  2000=100
In total CEEC-11  4.8  4.4 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.3 66  96 
In total CEEC-3  28.0  27.9 25.1 23.5 24.6 24.2 23.4 24.1 84  98 
In total "Stability" countries  24.0  23.0 20.1 20.0 21.2 20.7 20.1 21.3 84  100 
Memorandum: exports  4,890  4,940 4,293 3,925 4,822 5,114 5,749 7,540 80  156 
Notes: “Stability” countries include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania 
and Serbia and Montenegro. Due to the missing data, Bosnia & Herzegovina is based on IMF DOT data. 
Sources: UN COMTRADE Statistics and IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
In all, the grand failure of not staying the reform course following the introduction of the 
stabilization-cum-transformation program in 1991 seems to explain why Bulgaria’s export 
performance in the 1990s is reminiscent of developments in CIS economies rather than of CEEC-
10 economies including Romania. Economic mismanagement of transition until the 1996 crisis 
has exacted a huge toll on the Bulgarian economy. Quickly abandoned radical approach to first-
generation economic reforms locked Bulgaria, like most other CIS economies, into a path of 
partial reforms generating systemic corruption, plunder of state assets and ultimately producing a 
financial meltdown in 1996. Historically, high level of dependence on trade with CMEA 
countries had contributed to the high cost of adjustment. But had Bulgaria stayed the reform 
course in the early 1990s this cost would have been much smaller and spread over a shorter 
period of time, as the experience of Baltic States has clearly demonstrated. Macroeconomic 
stability and the pursuit of unfinished agenda of structural economic reform beginning in 1997 
have been behind improved export performance in 2000-03. 
C. Reorientation of foreign trade: unusual pattern? 
The most striking features of Bulgaria’s geographical pattern of foreign trade are the lack 
of increase in the share of the EU in total trade turnover since 1992 and reorientation of trade 
away from the EU in 1993-97 (Table 4). The share of the EU in total trade turnover was 51 
percent in 1992 and 52 percent in 2003, as the shares of the EU in Bulgaria’s exports and imports 
moved in opposite direction. The share in exports went up 11 percentage points while that in 
imports 12 percentage points.  
Reorientation in Bulgaria’s trade away from the EU in 1993-97 was driven by both 
exports and imports. The share of the EU in total trade turnover fell from 51 percent in 1992 to an 
average of around 40 percent during the 1993-97 period. It is interesting to note that this 
reorientation away from the EU appear to have coincided with the beginning of the second 
stabilization-cum-transformation program. Export reorientation, i.e., faster expansion in the 
growth of EU-oriented exports than in ROW-oriented exports, rather than import reorientation 
has been responsible for it. 
As mentioned earlier, Bulgaria’s geographical pattern of trade also diverged from other 
CEEC-10 economies. While non-EU exports of other CEEC-10 countries were falling during the 
initial stages of transition—in contrast to rapidly growing EU-oriented exports, Bulgaria’s 
succeeded in expanding its non-EU exports—most notably to Belarus—more than EU-oriented 
exports in 1992-95 (Figure 2).    -  12  -     
Table 4: Total trade turnover, exports and imports: EU-15 and Rest of World in 1992-2003 (in millions of 
US dollars and percent) 








        (total trade turnover in millions of US dollars)        
EU-15  2,648 2,699 3,472 4,392 4,010 3,723 3,765 4,361 5,073 5,652 6,735 7,719 166  152 
ROW  2,511 3,965 4,408 5,548 6,239 5,482 4,264 4,439 4,907 5,772 6,078 7,266 221  148 
Total  5,159 6,664 7,880 9,940 10,250 9,205 8,030 8,799 9,980 11,424 12,813  14,985 193  150 
     (in  percent)       
EU-15  51 41 44 44 39 40 47 50 51 49 53 52      86  101 
ROW  49 59 56 56 61 60 53 50 49 51 47 48  115  99 
      (export shares in percent)         
EU-15  45 47 47 46 39 40 45 51 54 52 55 56  103  104 
ROW  55  53  53  54 61 60 55 49 46 48 45  44    98     96 
Total (million 
of US $)  2,051 2,444 2,319 3,400 5,220 4,781 4,314 4,150 3,755 4,760 5,062 5,631 166  150 
      (import shares in percent)         
EU-15  56 37 43 43 40 41 49 48 49 48 51 49      78  100 
ROW  44 63 57 57 60 59 51 52 51 52 49 51  128  100 
Total (million 
of US $)  3,107  4,220  5,561  6,540 5,030 4,424 3,716 4,649 6,225 6,664 7,751  9,354  210  150 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
































Source: Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
In fact, it appears from the IMF Direction of Trade statistics that exports to Belarus 
shaped Bulgarian exports over 1994-99 displaying an unusual pattern of magnitude and volatility. 
They soared from US$ 570 million in 1994 to US$ 2 billion in 1995, accounting for 81 percent of 
the annual increase in the value of total exports (Table 5). They fell rather precipitously in 1996 
to a still respectable level of US$ 1.2 billion and their value over 1997-98 was still above US$ 
1billion. The size of contraction (US$ 831 million) was almost twice as large as the contraction in 
the value of total exports 
Bulgarian National Bank’s trade statistics do not back up the claim about unique Belarus’ 
role in Bulgarian export. These statistics, available only since 1995, portray a different image.  
First, total Bulgarian exports to CIS and Baltic states combined were lower according to BNB   -  13  -     
statistics than exports to Belarus alone. The differences were rather staggering: IMF-reported 
exports were 2.3-times, 1.3-times, 1.4 times, 2.1 times and 1.5 times as high as combined exports 
to CIS and Baltics in 1995-99. 
Table 5: Two statistical images of Bulgarian exports: total, EU-oriented, Belarus and CIS together with 
Baltic States (in millions of US dollars and percent) 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total exports (IMF)  5,220  4,781  4,314  4,150  3,755 
to EU (IMF)  2,013  1,913  1,942  2,137  2,035 
to Belarus (IMF)  2,036  1,205  1,223  1,083  545 
Total exports (BNB)  4,967  4,689  4,809  4,193  4,006 
to EU (BNB)  1,951  1,879  2,127  2,114  2,089 
to CIS and Baltic states (BNP)  889  906  846  520  359 
Difference total   5%  2%  -10%  -1%  -6% 
Difference EU  3%  2%  -9%  1%  -3% 
Difference Belarus vs. CIS/Baltics  129% 33% 45%  108% 52% 
Memorandum:                
EU share (IMF)  39%  40%  45%  51%  54% 
EU share (BNB)  39%  40%  44%  50%  52% 
Source: Bulgarian National Bank official statistics and IMF Direction of Trade database. 
From the point of view of this analysis, this is irrelevant who is right and who is wrong, 
as both sets of data coalesce in one important respect. The share of EU-15 in Bulgaria’s total 
exports is roughly similar in both statistics and underlines features setting Bulgaria apart from 
other CEEC-9 economies in its geographical pattern of trade in the 1990s. In contrast to other 
CEEC-9, Bulgaria’s shift towards the EU began to take place only in the late 1990’s. Contrast this 
with the developments in direction of trade of neighboring Romania: the share of the EU was 
larger in Bulgarian than in Romanian total exports but only in 1993. While Romanian exporters 
moved quickly to EU markets, this did not happen in Bulgaria until 1998 (Table 6). 
Table 6: Share of the EU-15 in Bulgaria’s total exports and Romania’s total exports in 1993-2003 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
EU-15 in Bulgaria' s exports  47%  46%  39% 40% 45% 51% 54% 52% 55% 56% 53% 
EU-15 in Romania' s exports  44%  55%  61% 65% 64% 71% 73% 73% 75% 73% 68% 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade database. 
Yet, had it not been for exports to the EU, the overall picture would have been bleaker, 
albeit exclusively during the 1997-99 crisis and the recovery phase that began in 2000. The fall in 
non-EU directed exports in 1997-99 was spectacular. In 1999 the value was almost 50 percent 
below its peak level in 1995. Huge fall in non-EU exports over 1997-99 rather than the explosion 
in EU-destined exports were responsible for the share of the EU to go above a 50 percent mark. 
Indeed, over 1996-99 EU-oriented grew on average at 2 percent per year, whereas non-EU 
exports fell at an annual rate of 11 percent. The total cumulative contraction in non-EU exports of 
58 percent was, however, only partly offset by EU-oriented exports as the value of EU-directed 
exports also fell in both 1996 and 1999 cumulatively by around 10 percent. In 2003, the value of 
EU-directed exports was, however, 87 percent above the 1995 level that of other exports was 
merely six percent higher. Hence, the reorientation of Bulgaria’s exports has occurred mainly at 
the expense of markets lost elsewhere.  
Bulgaria’s foreign trade statistics reported to the United Nations and available only since 
1996, not only substantiate the above observations about Bulgaria’s export performance in 1996-
99 but they also point to the convergence of developments in 2000-03 with trends observed in 
other CEEC-9 economies. The 2000-03 phase witnessed stronger growth in EU-exports, with the 
average growth rate of 15 percent as compared with 9 percent for non-EU exports.   -  14  -     
Reorientation in Bulgaria’s exports continued during the 2000-03 phase, with two 
important qualifications. First, in contrast to the preceding phase in 1996-99, which witnessed the 
collapse of exports to all markets except the EU, EFTA and aggregate market of CEEC-EU 2004 
entrants, Bulgarian presence increased everywhere with a few notable exceptions—SEE-5 and 
CIS-12 (Table 7). While overall exports to SEE-5 stagnated, this was due solely to highly volatile 
exports to Serbia and Montenegro. Exports to Russia and Ukraine continued their downward 
trend, and the relevance of CIS markets has further declined. Their share fell from 19 percent in 
1996 to 12 percent in 2000 and 3.6 percent in 2003. 
Table 7: Direction and dynamics of Bulgaria’s exports in 1996 and 1999-2003 (in millions of US dollars 
and percent) 
  (in millions of US dollars)  Index 1999 Index 2000 .  (in percent)   
 1996  2000  2001 2002 2003 1996=100 2000=100 1996 2000  2001  2002  2003
World 4,890  4,822  5,114 5,749 7,540 80  156  100 100  100  100  100
EU-15, of which  1,912  2,464  2,801 3,202 4,263 108  173  39.1 51.1  54.8  55.7  56.5
 Germany  442  435  488 549 812 88  187  9.0 9.0  9.5  9.5  10.8
              Greece  348  376  449 529 782 97  208  7.1 7.8  8.8  9.2  10.4
              Italy  493  684  765 886 1,057 112  155  10.1 14.2  15.0  15.4  14.0
CEEC-8, of which  118  122  135 168 239 111  195  2.4 2.5  2.6  2.9  3.2
Czech Republic  23  17  22 28 42 65  250  0.48 0.35  0.43  0.49  0.56
Estonia 4 4  4 3 5 110  125 0.08 0.08  0.07  0.04  0.07
Hungary 25 29  33 39 63 98  219  0.51 0.59  0.65  0.67  0.83
Latvia 6 7  6 7 9 125  134 0.13 0.14  0.11  0.12  0.12
Lithuania 13  6  8 8 11 48  183  0.26 0.12  0.15  0.14  0.14
Poland 31 28  35 41 62 94  224  0.64 0.57  0.68  0.72  0.82
Slovak Republic  11  6  9 18 18 69  320  0.24 0.12  0.17  0.31  0.24
Slovenia 4  27  20 25 30 877  110 0.08 0.56  0.39  0.43  0.39
EFTA  46  55 65 104 55 118  235  0.94 1.13  1.27  1.82  1.70
Romania 75  88  129 160 230 73  261  1.54 1.82  2.52  2.78  3.05
Turkey 384  495  413 536 690 74  139  7.86 10.26  8.07  9.32  9.15
Pan-European (all 
above) 
2,535 3,224  3,543 4,170 5,477 114  170  51.8 66.9 69.3  72.5  72.6
SEE-5, of which  530  540  385 384 508 63  94  10.83 11.20  7.53  6.68  6.74
Albania 43 24  27 40 30 75  125  0.88 0.50  0.53  0.70  0.40
BiH 3 9  10 11 10 300  108 0.06 0.19  0.20  0.19  0.13
Croatia 13  5  6 16 44 45  944  0.27 0.10  0.11  0.27  0.59
Macedonia 149 110  113 126 155 70  141  3.04 2.28  2.22  2.18  2.05
Moldova 91 16  19 17 21 21  131  1.86 0.33  0.38  0.30  0.27
Serbia & Mont  231  376  209 174 249 71  66  4.73 7.80  4.09  3.03  3.30
CIS (11), of which  927  458  520 242 268 55  59  19.0 9.5  10.2  4.2  3.6
Russia 480 118  120 92 105 39  89  9.8 2.5  2.3 1.6 1.4
              Ukraine  166  240  300 53 59 148  25  3.4 5.0  5.9  0.9  0.8
ROW 863  568  634 910 1,239 53  218  17.6 11.8  12.4  15.8  16.4
Source: Derived from UN COMTRADE database as reported by Bulgaria. 
Second, there has been a significant increase in Bulgarian supplies to markets of Central 
European countries, which once shared with Bulgaria membership in the long defunct CMEA, 
and now—except Romania—are members of the EU. Bulgarian exports to EU-2004 entrants 
almost doubled between 2000 and 2003 and to Romania almost tripled. Their aggregate share in 
Bulgaria’s exports rose from 4 percent in 1996 to 6 percent in 2002. 
In all, the share of pan-European countries in Bulgaria’s exports increased from 53 
percent in 1996 to 68 percent in 2000 and further expanded each year to reach 74 percent in 2003.  
Similar trends, albeit less pronounced, were observable on the import side. First, 
Bulgaria’s imports shifted towards the EU but only since 1997. Its share in Bulgaria’s total 
imports grew from 35 percent in 1996 to 44 percent in 2000 to 50 percent in 2001 and remained 
at this level in 2002-03. While among EU members, Italy has been the major market for 
Bulgarian exports, Germany has been Bulgaria’s major supplier accounting for around 14 percent 
of total imports in 2000-03 (Table 8). In a similar vein, Bulgaria’s imports have also shifted   -  15  -     
towards other pan-European partners. The share of CEEC-8 increased from 3 percent in 1996 to 6 
percent in 2003. So did the shares of Romania and Turkey. The latter displayed the strongest 
growth with its share in Bulgaria’s imports rising from 2 percent in 1996 to 4 percent in 2001 and 
6 percent in 2003. 
Table 8: Direction and dynamics of Bulgaria’s imports in 1996 and 1999-2003 (in millions of US dollars 
and percent) 
  (in millions of US dollars)  Index 1999 Index 2003 .  (in percent) 
  1996  2000  2001  2002 2003 1996=100  100=2000  1996 2000 2001 2002 2003
World  5,074  6,505 7,278  7,987 10,901 107  168  100 100 100 100 100
EU-15,  of  which  1,780  2,864 3,592 4,015 5,406 148  189  35.1 44.0 49.4 50.3 49.6
  Germany  575  903 1,112 1,139 1,555 141  172  11.3 13.9 15.3 14.3 14.3
              Greece  196  317  412  482 725 156  229  3.9 4.9  5.7  6.0  6.7
              Italy  319  550  699  906 1,115 144  203  6.3 8.5  9.6  11.3  10.2
CEEC-8  of  which 166 341  383  424 620 167  182  3.3 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.7
Czech  Republic  66 118  116  124 177 149  150  1.3 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6
Estonia  0  0  0  0 1 58  497  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary  33  62  80  102 135 148  219  0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.2
Latvia  1  1  1  1 2 29  281  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lithuania  4  3  3  6 13 82  520  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Poland  33  90  107  100 153 220  171  0.7 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4
Slovak  Republic  19  41  38  45 72 159  175  0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7
Slovenia  8  27  37  46 67 273  244  0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
EFTA  91  89  91  109 164   97  183  1.8 1.5  1.4  1.2  1.3
Romania  70 232  173  164 262 101  113  1.4 3.6 2.4 2.0 2.4
Turkey  96 215  274  394 667 171  311  1.9 3.3 3.8 4.9 6.1
SEE-5,  of  which  105  55  46  61 97 44  177  2.1 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.9
Albania  0  0  0  0 0 28  340  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BiH  0  0  0  1 1 113  277  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Croatia  5  4  2  14 31 42  836  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3
Macedonia  32  26  20  18 24 78  93  0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
Moldova  12  2  3  4 7 31  302  0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Serbia & Mont  56  23  21  24 34 27  151  1.1 0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3
CIS (11) of which  1,860  1,960  1,818  1,480 2,017 75  103  36.7 30.1  25.0  18.5  18.5
Russia 1,694  1,585 1,457 1,171 1,370 66  86  33.4 24.4 20.0 14.7 12.6
              Ukraine  122  335  323  248 430 195  128  2.4 5.2  4.4  3.1  3.9
ROW  1,015  804  949 1,401 1,792 78  223  20.0 12.4 13.0 17.5 16.4
Source: Derived from UN COMTRADE database as reported by Bulgaria. 
Last but not, significance of imports from CIS countries has continued similar downward 
path as in Bulgaria’s exports. Their aggregate share in Bulgaria’s imports fell from 30 percent in 
2000 to 19 percent in 2002-03. 
To sum up, Bulgaria’s geographical trade pattern has indeed displayed characteristics 
distinctive from other CEEC-9 economies. But this was only the case until around the financial 
crisis in 1996-97. Bulgaria’s trade peculiarity, not only confined to directions of trade but also 
revealed in Bulgaria’s factor content intensity of exports, came to an end in the period following 
the adoption and implementation of stabilization-cum-transformation program in 1997. While the 
share of the EU-15 in Bulgaria’s foreign trade remains below the levels of other CEEC-9 
economies, the share of trade with pan-European partners is at a similar level. The convergence to 
patterns of these countries occurred only during the current expansionary phase that began in 
2000. 
D. Dynamics of EU-destined exports in regional perspective 
Since changes in the exchange rate of the US dollar vis-à-vis Euro may distort dynamics 
of exports even examined in a comparative perspective, Table 9 and Figure 3 present the 
evolution of shares of Bulgaria in EU external imports against those of its regional partners—
CEEC-8, Romania and SEE-5. The data corroborate earlier observations about non-sustainability   -  16  -     
of Bulgaria’s EU-oriented export growth during the initial stages of transition; its overall 
lackluster performances through the 1990s and turn around in the early 2000s. Bulgaria increased 
its presence in EU markets in 1993-96 roughly to the same extent as CEEC-8, albeit significantly 
less than Romania. Indeed, until 1995 Bulgaria’s performance in these markets did not diverge 
from that of CEEC-8 or Romania.
10 However, in contrast to them, its performance was highly 
volatile indicating the persistent status of a marginal supplier (Figure 3). 
Table 9: Share of Bulgaria, CEEC-8 and SEE-5 in EU-15 external imports in 1993, 1996-97, 2000 and 
2003 (in percent)  
  









   1993 1996 1997 2000 2003 1993=100  1997=100 2000=100  1993=100  in  2003 
Bulgaria   0.22 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.37  132      90  128  168  5.7 
CEEC-8  5.29 7.12 7.40 8.34 11.1  135  115  133  210  8.6 
Romania   0.37 0.61 0.66 0.74 1.10  165  111  149  297  7.8 
SEE-5  0.51  0.49  0.53  0.42  0.54    96    85  129  106  8.0 
Source: Based on EU as reporter from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Figure 3: Annual change in shares in EU external imports in 1993-2003 (1999=100) 
Source: As in Table 9. 
While both CEEC-8 and Romania expanded their presence in EU markets in the 1990s, 
Bulgaria’s share in EU external imports stagnated. Consider that in 1999 its share was exactly the 
same as that in 1994. CEEC-8 and Romania’s shares were respectively 38 percent and 43 percent 
higher in 1999 than in 1994. Hence, the 1996-97 crisis, preceded by several years of policies 
destroying Bulgaria’s industrial base, exacted a heavy toll on Bulgaria’s export performance in 
EU markets.  
The improvement in export performance during the current expansionary phase so far has 
not been sufficient to compensate for the losses in Bulgaria’s competitive position experienced in 
the 1996-99 period and triggered by half decade of gross economic mismanagement. In 1996 
Bulgaria’s share in EU imports contracted 12 percent and it fell again in 1999 by 10 percent. 
Since 1999 Bulgaria has expanded its presence in EU markets roughly at the same pace as on 
average the SEE-5 economies and slightly below the growth in the share of the CEEC-8 in EU 
imports. Yet, its share in EU external imports was in 2003 only 12 percent above its peak level in 
1995 while that of CEEC-8 was 57 percent and Romania’s 80 percent in the same period. 
                                                           
10 During the 1989-95 phase Bulgaria recorded an average annual growth rate of its EU destined exports of 
21 percent and its share in EU external imports expanded on average at 14 percent. This compares very 
favorably to corresponding averages for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Only the Czech Republic 
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Bulgaria outperformed only SEE-5 economies, not a great achievement considering that civil 
wars and violence affected most of them. Their aggregate share in EU imports in 2003 stood at 
the same level as almost a decade ago in 1994. In terms of cumulative annual changes in growth 
rates in 1994-2003, Romania scored 120 percentage points, CEEC-8 scored 79 points, Bulgaria 
59 points and SEE-5 only 10 percentage points. 
E. Concluding observations 
The period following launching of the stabilization-cum-transformation program in 1997 
has three characteristics. First, it has witnessed continuation of an unavoidable shift away—which 
began in 1999—from the reliance on Eastern markets excluding former Central European 
members of the EU. The significance of the latter in Bulgaria’s trade has been on the increase. 
Second, exports of goods rather than services have been the driver of export expansion. The share 
of services in total exports slightly contracted over 1999-2003, although this might be due to their 
systematic underreporting in foreign trade statistics all over the world. Third, considering the 
depth of contraction during the crisis phase, the rebound in exports was relatively modest. It 
appears that improved, duty-free access to markets for industrial products taking around 80 
percent of Bulgarian exports of goods is yet to produce tangible positive effects. This is the price 
that the Bulgarian economy continues to be paying for flagrant economic mismanagement in 
1990-96.  
3.  Commodity composition of trade and the degree of processing 
Questions addressed in this section boil down to the following: What do the changes in 
import demand tell us about the pace of industrial restructuring?  What do the changes in exports 
depending on the degree of processing embodied in exported products tell us about Bulgaria’s 
industrial capacities? What characteristics do new star performers embody in terms of technology 
and the degree of processing? 
A. Changes in the composition of imports 
The composition of imports in terms of end-use product categories sheds light on changes 
in the domestic demand for various goods depending on the extent of their processing. Thus, for 
instance, the increase in imports of machinery usually points to the ongoing industrial 
restructuring effort. In a similar vein, the increase in automobiles and parts may be in part related 
to the emergence of firms specializing in production of parts or automobiles. In contrast to 
machinery, this would call for in-depth investigation of imports. 
Table 10 provides information on Bulgaria’s imports by end-use product categories from 
the world, pan-European partners (EU-25, EFTA, Romania and Turkey) and ROW together with 
their composition from each source. It also provides information on the change in the value of 
imports between 2003 and 1998. The reason for the selection of 1998 as a base year is that 1998 
market the first year that imports rebounded as well as it was the initial period for Bulgaria’s 
second attempt to move swiftly to an economy based on competitive markets. A cursory 
examination leads to the following observations: First, other consumer goods, or final 
manufactures, now account for more than half of Bulgaria’s total imports in large part due to the 
significant decline in imports of fuels. Their imports in terms of value stood at 44 percent of their 
level in 1998. Other consumer goods and automobiles and part recorded the largest increases 
between 1998 and 2003.  
Second, there are two indications of an ongoing industrial revival—continuing expansion 
of imports of industrial raw materials, which increased in line with total import demand growth, 
and the increase in the share of machinery in total imports. The value of these almost tripled 
between 1998 and 2003 and was 89 percent higher than in 2000.   -  18  -     
Table 10: Bulgaria’s imports by end-use product categories: total pan-European partners and ROW in 
1996 and 2000--2003(in millions of US dollars and percent) 
 Import Value (in millions of US dollars)                  Share in percent   Index 2003
1/
World  1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 1996 2000 2001 2002  2003  2000=100 
Agricultural Food & Feeds  516  422 482 557 732 10.2 6.5 6.6 7.0  6.7  173 
Industrial Raw Materials  225  368 410 364 592 4.4 5.7 5.6 4.6  5.4  161 
Machinery, excl Automobiles  653  1,172 1,420 1,554 2,220 12.9 18.0 19.5 19.5  20.4  189 
Automobiles & Parts  155  446 576 645 900 3.1 6.9 7.9 8.1  8.3  202 
Other Consumer Goods  1,809  2,412 4,021 4,594 6,023 35.7 37.1 55.2 57.5  55.3  250 
Fuels   1,716  1,683 368 274 434 33.8 25.9 5.1 3.4  4.0  26 
All Goods  5,074  6,505 7,278 7,987 10,901 100 100 100 100  100  168 
Pan-European economies          
Agricultural Food & Feeds  183  228 264 314 413 8.6 6.5 6.1 6.4  6.0  181 
Industrial Raw Materials  56  108 107 117 183 2.6 3.1 2.5 2.4  2.7  170 
Machinery, excl Automobiles  474  833 1,068 1,135 1,600 22.3 23.7 24.6 23.0  23.4  192 
Automobiles & Parts  117  400 529 590 810 5.5 11.4 12.2 11.9  11.9  202 
Other Consumer Goods  1,281  1,882 2,310 2,730 3,747 60.2 53.7 53.2 55.2  54.9  199 
Fuels   19  57 61 57 77 0.9 1.6 1.4 1.2  1.1  135 
All Goods  2,129  3,508 4,339 4,943 6,829 100 100 100 100  100  195 
Of which the EU-15          
Agricultural Food & Feeds  153  179 204 234 295 8.6 6.2 5.7 5.8  5.5  165 
Industrial Raw Materials  34  74 69 80 99 1.9 2.6 1.9 2  1.8  134 
Machinery, excl Automobiles  407  695 920 948 1,288 22.9 24.3 25.6 23.6  23.8  185 
Automobiles & Parts  105  376 501 557 754 5.9 13.1 13.9 13.9  14.0  201 
Other Consumer Goods  1,063  1,503 1,856 2,146 2,900 59.7 52.5 51.7 53.4  53.6  193 
Fuels   18  37 43 51 70 1 1.3 1.2 1.3  1.3  189 
All Goods  1,780  2,864 3,592 4,015 5,406 100 100 100 100  100  189 
ROW          
Agricultural Food & Feeds  333  195 218 243 319 11.3 6.5 7.4 8.0  7.8  164 
Industrial Raw Materials  169  260 303 248 409 5.7 8.7 10.3 8.1  10.0  157 
Machinery, excl. Automobiles  179  339 353 419 621 6.1 11.3 12.0 13.8  15.2  183 
Automobiles & Parts  38  46 47 55 90 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8  2.2  195 
Other Consumer Goods  528  530 1,711 1,864 2,276 17.9 17.7 58.2 61.2  55.9  430 
Fuels   1,697  1,626 308 216 357 57.6 54.3 10.5 7.1  8.8     22 
All Goods  2,945  2,996 2,939 3,044 4,072 100 100 100 100  100  136 
Memorandum: Share of 
manufactures in total imports  52% 62% 83% 85% 84%    
Note: The end-use categories are defined as Agricultural Food & Feeds (SITC 0+1+2+4-27-28); Industrial Raw Materials 
(SITC 27+28+68); Machinery, excluding automobiles (SITC 7-78), Automobiles & Parts (SITC 78), Other Consumer 
Goods (SITC 5+6+8+9-68); Fuels (SITC 3); and All Goods (0 to 9). 
1/ Index 2003 over 2000 refers to values of imports. 
Source: Based on Bulgaria's reporting to UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Third, the compositions of imports by end-use from pan-European countries and ROW 
differ pointing towards Bulgaria’s growing integration into Pan-European markets. Imports from 
the pan-European free trade area are much more processed, with fuels, agricultural foods and 
feeds and industrial raw materials accounting for less than ten percent. This share in Bulgaria’s 
imports from ROW is more than twice as large. Moreover, this gap appears to be growing. 
Although ROW suppliers seem to have been retained their competitive edge in Bulgaria’s 
markets for machinery and capital equipment excluding transportation,
11 they lost their share in 
Bulgaria’s imports of automotive products; it fell from around 20 percent in 1996-99 to 10 
percent in 2003.  
While suppliers from the EU-15 still tower above others, their dominant position has 
slightly weakened in all product categories except in automobiles and parts and agricultural foods 
and feeds. Their respective shares in Bulgaria’s imports of these products increased from 65 
percent and 39 percent in 1998 to 84 percent and 40 percent in 2003.  
                                                           
11 Their share Bulgaria’s imports of these products have been relatively stable at around 25-30 percent since 
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The shift towards the EU-15 or more generally pan-European countries as sources of 
imports that began to take place in the post-1996 crisis environment appears to have been related 
with first signs of industrial restructuring. Privatization and improvements in investment climate 
have prompted businesses to restructure and modernize their industrial base. Consider the 
following. First, the share of manufactures in Bulgaria’s exports has significantly increased. It 
grew from 52 percent in 1996 to 62 percent in 2000 and 84 percent in 2003 (Table 10 above). 
Furthermore, the weight of traditional inputs in Bulgaria’s imports has continued falling. 
      Second, this has been accompanied by the shift towards imports of manufactured 
products with higher technology content. Table 11 tabulates Bulgaria’s imports of manufactures 
from Pan-European free trade area for industrial products filtered in terms of technology. We use 
a simple taxonomy developed by Landesman and Stehrer (2003), modified in two respects: First, 
we restrict its application to manufactured products identified in Standard International Trade 
Classification as containing items 5 through 8 minus 68. Foods and feeds as well as other 
traditional production inputs are thus not taken into account. Second, we merge together two 
categories—low technology and labor intensive activities and resource intensive activities—
under a single heading of low technology products. In consequence, the taxonomy is limited to 
low technology products and medium to high tech products. The former category includes textiles 
and clothing, wood products, most chemicals, tires, etc. The latter include machinery and 
equipment, transport equipment, and electrical and optical equipment, pharmaceuticals, etc. The 
results presented in Table 11 show that medium to high technology products, accounting for 
around 60 percent of total manufactured imports from the Pan-European area, have expanded 
faster since 1997 than imports of low technology products. 
Table 11: “Technology content” of Bulgaria’s manufactured imports from Pan-European area in 1996-
2003 (in millions of US dollars and percent) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Index,  1999  Index,  2003
    (in millions of US dollars)  1997=100  2000=100
Low-technology products  773  820 865 988 1,184 1,413 1,593 2,243 120  189 
Medium to high tech products  1,128  1,096 1,452 1,845 1,962 2,526 2,830 3,859 168  197 
Total 1,902  1,917 2,316 2,834 3,146 3,940 4,422 6,102 148  194 
    (in terms of percent)   
Low-technology products  41  43 37 35 38 36 36 37   81  98 
Medium to high tech products  59  57 63 65 62 64 64 63 114  101 
Memorandum: Share of Pan-European imports   
in Bulgaria's manufactured 
imports  78 78 77 81 82 83 83 82 104  100 
in Bulgaria's total imports  23  22 34 47 41 49 49 51 212  126 
Source: Own calculations based on Bulgaria's reporting to UN COMTRADE database. 
Another indication of some progress in industrial restructuring is the improvement in 
Bulgaria’s net exports of machinery between 1999 and 2003. Exports of machinery in terms of 
their imports increased from 38 percent in 2001 to 42 percent in 2003 (Table 12). Taking into 
account that the value of these imports in 2003 was 83 percent above their 2000 level, this strikes 
one as quite an impressive export performance. It appears that the “EU-15-connection” has been 
crucial not only as a supplier but also as a buyer accounting for more than 50 percent of turnover 
in machinery and automobiles and parts. Consider that both exports of machinery and 
automobiles and parts grew fastest in terms of their imports from the EU. This was not because of 
falling imports from the EU as these increased in 2000-03 by 105 percent (machinery) and 85 
percent (automobiles and parts).   -  20  -     
Table 12: Exports of end-use products in terms of their imports in 1996-2003 (in percent) 
Export in percent of imports   
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Agricultural Food & Feeds  199 147 167 180 143 127 149  127 
Industrial Raw Materials  210 187 122 143 166 132 154  131 
Machinery, excluding Automobiles 87 77 61 35 38 38 44 42 
Automobiles & Parts  24 17 8.8 9.3 4.3 3.7 5.0  4.8 
Other Consumer Goods  136 149 113 101 107 73 72  73 
Fuels   19 25 15 25 33 125 126  101 
All Goods  96 100 86 73 74 70 72  69 
Source: Based on Bulgaria's reporting from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
B. Degree of processing embodied in EU-oriented exports: end-use product categories 
The composition of exports in terms of end-use product categories sheds light on changes 
in the extent of processing embodied in exported products as well as to differences in drivers of 
growth in both 1996-99 and 2000-03 phases in terms of the level of processing embodied in 
exports. Table 13 presents the structure of Bulgaria’s EU-15-oriented exports in these categories. 
Table 13: EU-oriented exports by end-use product categories in 1996-2003(in millions of US dollars): 
composition and share in EU imports (in percent) 
  Exports to EU (in million of US dollars) Average growth rate 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  1996-99  2000-03 
Food & Feed (0+1+2+4-27-28)  359 354 346 334 256 289 428 404  -1.8  12.1
Industrial Raw Materials (27+28+68)  231 248 286 297 548 368 380 538    6.5  -0.5
Machinery, excluding auto (7-78)  200 176 217 243 250 283 369 525    5.0  20.4
Automobiles & Parts (78)  24 9 12 10 11 14 22 29 -20.0  28.7
Consumer Goods (5+6+8+9-68)  1,330 1,541 1,626 1,460 1,693 2,029 1,952 2,543    2.4  10.7
of which: textiles (65)  73 80 88 68 64 86 121 156 -1.7 25.1
clothing (84)  398 477 598 629 729 911 872 1,154 12.1 12.2
footwear (623 and 85)  103 128 121 111 116 161 172 222   1.8  17.7
Fuels (3)  33 46 31 16 59 117 46 151 -16.4  26.3
All Goods (0 to 9)  2,204 2,410 2,539 2,378 2,840 3,120 3,290 4,272 1.9  10.7
   Composition of exports (in percent)    Index, 1999 Index, 2003
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  1996=100 2000=100
Food & Feed (0+1+2+4-27-28)  16.3 14.7 13.6 14.0 9.0 9.3 13.0 9.5 86  105
Industrial Raw Materials (27+28+68)  10.5 10.3 11.3 12.5 19.3 11.8 11.6 12.6 119  65
Machinery, excluding auto (7-78)  9.1 7.3 8.6 10.2 8.8 9.1 11.2 12.3 113  140
Automobiles & Parts (78)  1.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 38  183
Consumer Goods (5+6+8+9-68)  60.4 63.9 64.0 61.4 59.6 65.0 59.3 59.5 102  100
of which: textiles (65)  3.3 3.3 3.5 2.9 2.2 2.8 3.7 3.6 86 163
clothing (84)  18.1 19.8 23.5 26.4 25.7 29.2 26.5 27.0 146 105
footwear (623 and 85)  4.7 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 99  128
Fuels (3)  1.5 1.9 1.2 0.7 2.1 3.7 1.4 3.5 45  169
   Share in EU imports (in percent)    Average growth rate 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  1996-99  2000-03
Food & Feed (0+1+2+4-27-28)  0.41 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.32 0.36 0.52 0.42 0.3  7.0
Industrial Raw Materials (27+28+68)  0.78 0.79 0.88 0.99 1.54 1.13 1.24 1.49 6.2  -0.8
Machinery, excluding auto (7-78)  0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.16 -0.6  18.4
Automobiles & Parts (78)  0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 -27.6  17.5
Consumer Goods (5+6+8+9-68)  0.50 0.55 0.55 0.49 0.53 0.63 0.58 0.64 -0.5  4.7
of which: textiles (65)  0.42 0.43 0.45 0.37 0.34 0.48 0.67 0.76 -2.6 21.8
clothing (84)  0.87 1.00 1.20 1.25 1.44 1.74 1.58 1.74 9.4 4.9
footwear (623 and 85)  1.28 1.45 1.40 1.22 1.22 1.55 1.56 1.69 -1.2  8.6
Fuels (3)  0.14 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.20 0.36 0.24 0.37 -12.9  16.4
All Goods (0 to 9)  0.29 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.37 -0.9  6.0
Source: Based on EU Data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Data tabulated in Table 13 point to an increase in the level of processing embodied in 
exports during the current phase, as captured by changes in the weight of foods and feeds together 
with industrial raw materials. These are regarded as traditional production inputs that is, not   -  21  -     
processed in their present form (Feenstra 1998). Their share in Bulgaria’s EU-oriented exports, 
which because of vulnerability to weather fluctuated significantly in both periods, fell from an 
average of 26 percent in 1997-99 to an average of 24 percent in 2000-03. Simultaneously, 
however, their aggregate share in EU external imports of traditional inputs increased from an 
average of 0.5 percent to 0.7 percent in respective periods.  
Another indication of the shift towards more processed goods in Bulgaria’s export offer 
is a very sizable increase in the aggregate share of machinery and automobiles and parts. Their 
share in Bulgaria’s EU-oriented exports increased from an average of 9 percent in 1996-99 to 12 
percent in 2002 and 13 percent in 2003. Simultaneously, Bulgarian producers outperformed 
suppliers from other countries, with the aggregate share of these products in EU external imports 
increasing from an average of 0.09 percent in 1997-99 to 0.12 percent in 2002 and 0.14 percent in 
2003. While these shares are below the share of Bulgarian exports in EU total external imports of 
0.37 percent in 2003, the dynamics of change has been impressive. 
Although the EU absorbed most of the increase in Bulgaria’s sales of machinery and 
parts, the emergence of machinery as a driver of Bulgaria’s exports in 2000-03 was not limited to 
EU markets. The share of the EU in Bulgaria’s exports of these products increased from 51 
percent in 2001 to 55 percent in 2003 (Table 14). But exports to other markets experienced 
explosive double-digit growth as well. Exports of machinery and parts to CEEC-8 rose 20 percent 
in 2001, 65 percent in 2002 and 28 percent in 2003. As a result, their share in Bulgaria’s CEEC-
8-oriented exports rose from 19 percent in 2001 to 25 percent in 2002 and slightly fell in 2003 
because of huge increase in sales of agricultural products. The latter exploded 70 percent in 2002 
over 2003. In all, CEEC-8 took 6 percent of Bulgaria’s machinery exports in 2003.  
Table 14: Share of the EU-15 and pan-European partners in Bulgaria’s exports in 1996-2003 (in percent) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
European Union (15)     
Agricultural Food & Feeds  28.9 33.0 37.2 41.1 36.7 42.2  46.3  43.9 
Industrial Raw Materials  44.2 47.7 57.5 60.7 65.4 63.0  63.5  65.7 
Machinery, excluding Automobiles  35.0 34.0 38.9 51.7 52.2 51.0  49.9  54.6 
Automobiles & Parts  62.0 35.2 42.5 20.0 40.4 57.5  69.3  71.9 
Other Consumer Goods  45.6 50.1 57.2 60.2 59.7 60.4  59.0  61.4 
Fuels    19.2 24.3 13.1 18.2 11.0 29.9 44.2 20.8 
All  Goods  39.1 43.3 49.7 52.5 51.1 54.8 55.7 56.5 
Pan-European countries
1/     
Agricultural Food & Feeds  38.6 43.5 51.6 57.6 52.3 55.6  58.8  63.7 
Industrial Raw Materials  70.5 71.5 76.8 73.8 82.4 77.0  80.8  82.2 
Machinery, excluding Automobiles  44.0 44.3 54.5 60.7 63.2 62.2  62.8  64.1 
Automobiles & Parts  73.4 58.1 55.1 25.1 55.3 66.1  75.6  79.2 
Other Consumer Goods  53.5 58.4 67.1 70.0 72.9 72.2  73.5  73.3 
Fuels    43.3 56.6 41.3 39.6 25.5 40.2 55.3 34.6 
All  Goods  50.4 55.7 62.6 64.6 65.0 66.8 69.8 69.7 
1/ Include EU-25, EFTA, Romania and Turkey. 
Source: Based on Bulgaria’s data reported to the UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
As a result, Bulgaria has been increasingly integrating into pan-European markets for 
more processed goods. These markets took 64 percent of Bulgarian exports of machinery in 2003, 
up from 61 percent in 1999 and 79 percent of automobiles and parts in 2003, up from 55 percent 
in 2000. However, the latter accounted for a miniscule part of Bulgaria’s total exports. 
C. Level of technology embodied in EU-oriented exports and competitiveness 
Although, not surprisingly, low technology activities continue dominating Bulgaria’s EU-
15 oriented exports, products of medium to high technology emerged in 2002-03 as levers of 
Bulgarian exports (see Section B above for the filter used to identify exports according to 
technological level). These products registered growth exceeding the growth of EU-oriented   -  22  -     
exports of manufactures in both 1997-99 and 2000-03. These exports in terms of value doubled 
between 2000 and 2003 and their share in manufactured exports increased from 22 percent in 
2000 to 27 percent in 2003 (Table 15). In consequence, the trend dominant in 1997-98 of low-
technology labor intensive products being the major levers of Bulgaria’s exports appear to have 
been reversed.  
Table 15: EU-oriented exports of manufactures by the type of technology involved in their production in 
1996-2003 (in percent) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Index,  1999  Index,  2003
    (in millions of US dollars) 1997=100  2000=100
Low-technology products  1,230  1,429 1,498 1,306 1,531 1,851 1,734 2,252 91  147 
Medium to high tech products  323  297 356 404 422 474 603 843 136  200 
TOTAL MANUFACTURES  1,554  1,726 1,855 1,710 1,952 2,325 2,336 3,095 99  159 
    (in terms of percent)   
Low-technology products  79  83 81 76 78 80 74 73 92  93 
Medium to high tech products  21  17 19 24 22 20 26 27 137  126 
    Exports in percent of imports   
Low-technology products  190  227 208 180 189 196 163 156 79  82 
Medium to high tech products  34  35 29 30 31 28 32 34 85  108 
TOTAL MANUFACTURES  97  117 96 82 91 88 79 79 70  87 
    Share in EU imports   
Low-technology products  0.68  0.77 0.76 0.67 0.74 0.90 0.82 0.90 88  120 
Medium to high tech products  0.10  0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.17 114  176 
TOTAL MANUFACTURES  0.30  0.32 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.36 0.36 0.39 86  134 
    Export Specialization Index   
Low-technology products  2.24  2.36 2.39 2.41 2.55 2.50 2.28 2.28 102  90 
Medium to high tech products  0.36  0.30 0.31 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.44 0.46 125  140 
TOTAL MANUFACTURES  1.05  1.06 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.04 1.06 95  106 
Memorandum: share of manufactures in Bulgaria's EU-15 exports   
 70.5 71.6 73.0 71.9 68.7 74.5 71.0 72.4 100  105 
Source: Own calculations based on EU-15 trade data reported to the UN COMTRADE database. 
Although Bulgaria’s continues specializing in low-technology products in EU-15 
markets, medium- to high technology intensive products have outperformed since 2000 low-
technology products across all dimensions. They had the largest increase in competitiveness in 
EU-15 markets as measured by the share in EU external imports, which—after having been 
stagnant at around 0.10 percent in 1996-1999—increased 76 percent in 2000-03. Net exports of 
medium to high tech product, albeit still well below their imports, have considerably increased 
since 2000 in contrast to net exports of manufactures to EU-15 markets. This has taken place 
against the background of rapidly expanding imports, which stood in 2003—in terms of value—at 
185 percent of their level in 2000. The value of Export Specialization index (ESI) in EU markets 
fell for low-technology products from its record level of 2.55 in 2000 to 2.28 in both 2002 and 
2003. Simultaneously, the value of the ESI for medium to high technology exports has 
significantly increased, although it still has a long way to go to exceed the unit value indicating 
the status of revealed comparative advantage and specialization in EU-15 markets.  
D. Emerging top export performers in EU markets 
To what extent this shift towards trade in more technologically advanced products has 
impacted Bulgaria’s competitiveness in EU markets? What products have emerged, as top 
performers in Bulgaria’s EU-oriented exports during the current expansionary phase? It would be 
tempting to argue that Bulgaria’s export basket has changed little since 1996. For instance, almost 
all top 20 largest exporters in 2003 were also among top 20 not only in 2002 but also in 1999 and 
1996—17 products were present in 2002, 15 in 1999 and 13 in 1996. Those that failed to be 
among top 20 in previous years were significant exporters within the group of top 50 except for 
two items—electrical wires (SITC. 7731) and motor spirit and other light oils (SITC 3341). Last   -  23  -     
but not least, top 20 products accounted consistently for around half of Bulgarian EU-oriented 
exports (Table 16). 
Table 16: Top twenty four-digit SITC exporters to the EU in 2003 and their rankings in 1996, 1999 and 
2002 
SITC-4 Product  Exports  (in 
millions of US$) 
Ranking in 
    2003  2003 2002 1999 1996 
6821  Copper and copper alloys, refined   349.9  1  1  1  1 
8439  Other outer garments of textile fabrics 236.2  2  2  3  15 
6727  Iron or steel coils for re-rolling  165.2  3  3  2  2 
8510  Footwear  121.0  4 6 5 6 
8451  Jerseys, pull-overs, twinsets, cardigan 115.3  5  5  10  9 
3341  Motor spirit and other light oils  108.7  6  32 98  150 
8462  Under garments, knitted of cotton  104.9  7  9  7  13 
6123  Parts of footwear  100.7  8  7  13  8 
8431  Coats and jackets of textile fabric    94.3  9  8  8  15 
8423  Trousers, breeches etc   93.4  10  10  11  16 
8435  Blouses of textile fabrics   88.4  11  11  10  14 
8441  Shirts, men's, of textile fabrics   72.7  12  12  16  11 
7492  Taps, cocks, valves etc.   69.7  13  13  15  50 
8219  Other furniture and parts   59.7  14  16  21 48 
8434  Skirts, women's, of textile fabrics   58.0  15  18  20  24 
8429  Other outer garments of textile   56.3  16  17  18  21 
8422  Suits, men's, of textile fabrics   54.0  17  15  23  34 
6744  Sheets & plates, rolled >4.75mm    49.4  18  19  17  5 
7731  Insulated, elect. wire, cable, bars   49.4  19  50 104 61 
8424  Jackets, blazers of textile fabrics   48.8  20  23 26 17 
Number of items that were beyond top twenty of the 2003 list  0  3  5  7 
Share in total EU-oriented exports  49%  48%  52%  46% 
Source: Based on EU Data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Yet, this conclusion may not be warranted. In fact, Bulgaria’s export expansion did not 
consist of merely exporting more of the same products. The evidence abound. First, as discussed 
earlier, the levers of export growth during the current phase have been medium to high 
technology products, with their share in manufactured exports rising 22 percent in 2000 to 27 
percent in 2003. Under these conditions, it would appear that rather a considerable reshuffling in 
Bulgaria’s export offer has been taking place.  
Indeed, the analysis of the group of top export performers in 2000-03 identified in terms 
of the degree processing confirms the observation about significant realignment in Bulgaria’s 
export offer (Table 17). The share of top export-products in EU-oriented exports rose rather 
spectacularly, albeit not unexpectedly given their at least 30 percent average growth per year in 
order to qualify for the status of fast grower, from 4 percent in 2000 to 16 percent in 2003. 
Simultaneously, the value of correlation coefficient between shares in Bulgaria’s EU-oriented 
exports of top twenty four-digit SITC products in 2000 and 2003 was relatively low at 0.49. 
Machinery and parts together with consumer products have been major drivers of this 
growth. The difference between the composition of Bulgaria’s total EU-oriented exports and of 
‘top performing’ exports stems largely from a discernible shift away from traditional production 
inputs to higher value added machinery and parts. Leaving aside 2002, when the one-year surge 
in exports of sunflower seeds and wheat raised the share of foods and feeds in Bulgaria’s exports, 
the share of traditional inputs fell from 31 percent in 2000-01 to 27 percent in 2003. This share 
was in 2003 five percentage points higher than the share of traditional inputs in Bulgaria’s total 
EU-oriented exports, which stood at 22 percent. But the share of machinery and parts in total 
exports of top performers of 38 percent is well above that in Bulgaria’s total EU-oriented exports 
in 2003, which amounted to ‘only’ 13 percent. The difference in the shares of consumer goods in 
two export baskets was even larger: 35 percent as compared with 65 percent for total EU-oriented   -  24  -     
exports. If anything, this suggests that consumer goods, mainly clothing, ceased to be the major 
drivers of exports to the EU, as they were in 1997-99. 
Table 17: Composition of fastest growers (above 30 percent on average over 2000-03) in EU markets by 
End-Use (in millions of US dollars and percent) 
  Exports (millions of US dollars) Average 
growth rate
Share in exports of top performers 
(in percent) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003  2000-03  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Foods and feeds  12.7 34.5 159.7 86.8 61.6  11.7  13.0  31.6  12.8 
Industrial raw materials  21.2 48.8 68.7 99.4 47.1  19.5  18.4  13.6  14.6 
Automobiles and parts  1.0 5.2 9.1 14.7 95.8    0.9    2.0    1.8    2.2 
Machinery, excluding automobiles  40.5 74.5 136.4 244.4 56.7  37.2  28.0  27.0  35.9 
Consumer  Goods  33.5 102.6 132.0 234.9 62.8  30.7 38.6 26.1 34.5 
of which textiles  12.1 23.5 47.5 74.2 57.5  11.1    8.8    9.4  10.9 
clothing  2.3 4.2 7.5 14.9 59.9    2.1    1.6    1.5    2.2 
Total (in million of US dollars)  108.9 265.7 505.9 680.3 58.1  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Memo: Share in total exports to EU  3.8 8.5 15.4 15.9        
Source: Based on EU Data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Table 18 identifies top ten four-digit products that experienced the fastest growth in EU-
oriented exports over 2000-03. Except for sands (SITC 2733) and other wheat (0412), all of them 
are manufactures each with the value of exports exceeding US$ 1 million in 2003. None of these 
exports exceeded US$ 500,000 in 2003, and top three exported less than US$ 100,000. Except for 
blooms (SITC 6725), with exports worth US$ 12 million in 1997, and halogenated derivatives 
(5113), with exports of US$ 1.2 million in 1996 and US$ 1.8 million in 1997, not a single product 
exceeded the one-million dollar benchmark in 1996-2000. Last but not least, it is worth noting 
that except for air conditioners (7415) and photographic parts (8811) the shares of other products 
in EU external imports exceed the share of total Bulgarian exports in EU imports of 0.37 percent 
in 2003. 
Table 18: Ten four-digit SITC sectors with the highest growth in exports in 2000-03 
 Exports 
('000$) 
Average growth of 
exports 
Share in EU 
imports 
Average growth in 
share 
SITC-4 Product    2003 2000-03  2003  2000-03 
7415    Air conditioning machines. self-contained 3,412 434  0.10  403 
5113    Halogenated derivatives of hydrocarbon  2,610 384  0.44  368 
8811    Photographic, cameras, parts & access  1,078 203  0.11  242 
7451    Tools for working in the hand, pneumatic 3,305 196  0.43  174 
6725    Blooms, billets, slabs & sheet bars  21,694 182  1.33  165 
2733    Sands, natural, of all kinds   4,772 158  4.62  148 
7758    Electro-thermic appliances, n.e.s.  24,693 158  0.64  126 
0412    Other wheat (including spelt)  13,262 156  1.70  118 
6760    Rails and railway track construction  2,179 146  1.57  92 
6781    Tubes and pipes, of cast iron  2,032 144  5.18  109 
Source: Based on EU Data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Among products with the compound annual growth rate of exports over 2000-03 
exceeding 30 percent, electro-engineering industry (SITC. 76 and 77) clearly stands out. Its share 
in these exports grew from 6 percent in 1997 to 12 percent in 2001 and 14 percent in 2003. More 
significantly, while in 1996-2000 exports of electro-engineering products had merely kept pace 
with the growth in EU import demand, with their aggregate share fluctuating between 0.08 
percent and 0.09 percent; Bulgarian firms outperformed other exporters each year in 2001-2003. 
The share of these products in EU external imports increased from 0.08 percent in 2000 to 0.16 
percent in 2001, 0.26 percent in 2002 and 0.39 in 2003.
12 The latter value was above Bulgaria’s 
                                                           
12 In consequence, the share of Bulgaria in EU external imports of machinery increased from 0.09 percent 
in 2001, which equaled the peak level reached in 1996, to 0.15 percent in 2002 and 0.17 percent.   -  25  -     
share in total external EU imports in 2003. 
Electro-engineering products have been responsible not only for a significant increase of 
machinery in Bulgaria’s total EU-destined exports from 2 percent in 1997-98 to 6 percent in 2003 
but also for a dramatic reshuffling of Bulgaria’s export offer of machinery products. Consider 
that the aggregate share of fast growers in Bulgaria’s EU-destined exports of machinery (SITC 7) 
increased from 47 percent in 2000 to 63 percent in 2001 and 81 percent in 2003. Furthermore, 
among top four-digit SITC products of this sector in terms of growth, there are at least three 
relative newcomers to EU markets: radiotelegraphic and radiotelephonic items (SIT 7643), 
telecommunications equipment (7648) and electro-thermic appliances (7758), with their 
respective annual growth rates in 2000-03 of 128 percent, 123 percent and 158 percent, 
respectively. The values of their exports were below US$ 500,000 in 1996. In contrast, exports of 
household-type refrigerators (SITC 7752), which recorded the fourth fastest growth in sales in EU 
markets in 2000-03, run in millions of US dollars already during this period indicating earlier 
established commercial presence in these markets (Table 19).  
Table 19: Top four export performers in electro-engineering products in EU markets in 1996-2003 (in 
thousands of US dollars) 
SITC-
4  Product  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Index, 
2003 
         (in million of US dollars)     2000=100 
7643   
Radiotelegraphic & 
radiotelephonic   0.02 0.08 1.12 1.19 0.66 0.89  1.9 17.8  2708 
7648    Telecommunications equipment  0.17  0.32  0.14  0.68  0.28  0.87  6.6  6.8  2467 
7758    Electro-thermic appliances   0.21  0.17  0.40  0.64  0.56  0.54  11.3  24.7  4430 
7752    Household type refrigerators  3.81  2.23  5.49  4.76  1.42  12.2  19.2  30.3  2134 
    TOTAL  ABOVE  4.21 2.80 7.16 7.27 2.91 14.5 38.9 79.6  2735 
Memorandum:     (in percent)       
7 
Share of the above in EU-
destined exports of machinery  5.8  6.9 13.6 10.7  3.8 14.1 23.2 31.8      834 
  
Share of the above in EU 
imports  0.06 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.03 0.14 0.31 0.47  1650 
Source: Based on EU Data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Exports of household type refrigerators provides an interesting illustration of sectoral 
“hick-ups’ usually triggered by restructuring. They fell dramatically in 2000 and rebounded 
massively the following year exceeding the earlier peak level in 1997 by a factor of 2.2. 
Another indication of the ongoing change in Bulgaria’s export basket triggered by 
industrial restructuring is the sheer growth of electro-engineering products. The value of their 
aggregate exports in 2003 was 27-times higher than in 2000, with their share in EU external 
imports rising 117-times in 2003 over the 2000 level. 
E. Conclusions 
The answers to three questions raised in the introduction to this section can be 
summarized as follows. First, changes in import demand suggest that the process of industrial 
restructuring has at last begun. The share of manufactures in Bulgaria’s imports has not only 
significantly increased but, within manufactures, there has been the shift towards products with 
higher technology content and capital goods. Bulgaria’s growing integration into pan-European 
markets for manufactures has accompanied this shift. 
Second, Bulgaria’s export offer has become more processed indicating progress in 
modernization of industrial capacities. The fall in the share of traditional inputs, i.e., products 
used for further processing, in Bulgaria’s exports has been accompanied by a marked increase in 
the share of machinery. This, combined with the increase of more technologically advanced 
manufactures in Bulgaria’s exports, suggests a gradual shift towards more processed exports.    -  26  -     
Third, recent star performers in highly competitive EU-15 markets, now accounting for 
16 percent of Bulgaria’s exports up from 4 percent in 2000, are mainly electro-engineering 
products. Exports of machinery top the list, contributing almost 40 percent to the total of top 
performers’ exports. Hence, new exports come mainly from restructured industrial capacities 
auguring well for future competitiveness in international markets. 
4.  Factor endowments and patterns of specialization 
Considering endowment of Bulgaria in factors of production—temperate climate, available land 
for agricultural production and educated labor force—one would expect skilled labor intensive 
and natural resource intensive products dominate its export basket. The factor intensities of 
Bulgaria’s EU-oriented exports in 1991-96 were not in line with these expectations (Figure 4).  
These developments raise several important questions: How has its export basket in terms 
of factor intensities evolved over time? Did the initial specialization in skilled labor intensive and 
capital intensive deviate from Bulgaria’s real patterns of comparative advantage? Was it a fad 
reflecting misguided socialist industrialization not sustainable in confrontation with realities of 
market competition? Or, alternatively, has Bulgaria’s endowment in factors of production 
changed since the collapse of central planning and its current exports simply reflect this new 
reality?  In answering these questions, we shall focus on highly contestable EU markets, as the 
latter provide a sharp image of the revealed capacity of Bulgarian producers to compete in 
products with different factor intensities.  
A. Bulgaria’s endowment in factors of production 
What is Bulgaria’s endowment in factors of production? Historically, under central 
planning and specialization assigned within the now defunct CMEA, Bulgaria specialized in 
skilled labor and resource intensive products. But since almost 15 years have passed since the 
collapse of central planning have passed, a more pertinent question relates to products in which in 
terms of their factor intensity that Bulgaria is predetermined to specialize now.  Data tabulated in 
Table 8 offer some glimpses to this question by shedding light Bulgaria’s endowments in the 
perspective of other CEEC-10 including Croatia and Romania. First, Bulgaria is well endowed 
with land; although the land per capita is slightly below the average for both CEEC-11 economies 
and the EU-15, Bulgaria has relatively more arable land. While the comparators do not include all 
potential competitors in pan-European markets, and therefore no firm conclusion can be drawn 
about comparative advantage, one may expect the potential for specialization in agricultural 
products. Like most other CEEC-10, except Poland and Romania, Bulgaria does not have any 
significant deposits of natural resources. The value of natural resource index, which ranges 
between zero (no resources) and two (very well endowed), was zero. Poland and Romania got the 
score of one. Thus, notwithstanding the differences in GDP per capita and deposits of minerals, 
CEEC-11 countries have rather comparable endowments in terms of the potential to specialize in 
natural resource intensive products. 
Second, Bulgaria is a net exporter of electricity. Its consumption per capita is slightly 
lower than the CEEC-11 average. This combination points to some potential for the development 
of energy intensive production lines provided that its price is competitive. 
Last but not least, the data suggests that Bulgaria is well endowed with skilled labor 
force. Although the proportion of labor with secondary education is below the average for CEEC-
11, but the difference is not large and the value of this indicator is still above the average for the 
EU-15. Together with relatively low level value of the indicator of labor market participation (see 
note to Table 20), this suggests a significant potential for the expansion of skilled labor intensive 
production.   -  27  -     




































Bulgaria  0.014  40.0  55.3  42.0  49.2  5,424   3,056   0 
Croatia  0.013  26.1  60.4 /3  ..  ..  2,752   2,834   0 
Romania  0.010  40.8  60.2  44.4  54.7  2,463   4,979   1 
                
Czech Republic  0.008  39.8  79.2  50.0  59.3  7,484   3,882   0 
Estonia  0.031  16.0  58.1  48.9  58.7  6,278   3,099   0 
Hungary  0.009  50.1  65.7  41.2  49.8  3,559   2,074   0 
Latvia  0.027  29.7  65.8  48.5  57.5  1,700   1,929   0 
Lithuania  0.019  45.2  63.2  47.4  58.2  5,108   2,498   0 
Poland  0.008  45.9  70.9  44.4  54.7  3,770   1,595   1 
Slovak Republic  0.009  ..  79.1  48.7  60.2  6,028   4,222   0 
Slovenia  0.010  8.6  63.2  49.0  56.5  7,480   5,998   0 
CEEC-11 /d  0.014  34.2 /1  66.1  46.4  55.9  4,732   3,288    
Bulgaria as % of 
CEEC-11 average  98% 117%  84%  90%  88%  115%  93%   
EU15 /d  0.014  24.3 /2  44.4  /4  47.1  56.7  7,073   6,086    
Notes: All data are for 2003, unless otherwise specified; 1/ Excluding Slovak Republic; 2/ Excluding Luxembourg;  /3 2001 
data; 4/ Excludes France (no secondary ed. data available); 2002 data used for the Netherlands. 
 /a Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education - levels 3-4 (ISCED 1997);          
 /b ILO Methodology: Economically active population divided by total population over 15.  
 /c Falcetti et al. EBRD 2004.  Countries are rated from 0 to 2, 2 being the highest. 
 /d Simple average.       
Sources: EUROSTAT, WDI 2004. 
Furthermore, the cost of labor as measured in terms of the average gross monthly wage is 
very low by regional standards. In fact, it was well below the levels not only in CEEC-8, i.e., new 
EU members, but also in SEE countries. Albania’s average gross monthly, the second lowest, was 
11 percent higher in 2003 and 23 percent higher in 2004. Romania’s average wage was 30 
percent above that of Bulgaria’s in 2004. Had there been no other constraints, this alone would 
have made Bulgaria extremely attractive for labor intensive activity. 
In all, like other CEEC-10, Bulgaria has the potential to specialize in labor intensive 
products, with the possible bias in favor of skilled labor intensive goods, and, to a lesser extent, 
natural resource intensive products embracing mostly agricultural goods. On might also add to 
this list the capital-intensive goods, albeit with a caveat. The experience of transition countries 
shows significant contribution of FDI taking advantage of relatively cheap and highly skilled 
labor thus reducing relative shortage of capital. 
B. Factors content of Bulgaria’s exports in comparative perspective 
Patterns in trade in goods reflect differences in comparative advantage as determined by 
different factor endowments among countries. A country tends to export those goods, which use 
factors in relative abundance. However, this fully takes place if there is a competitive market 
mechanism efficiently allocating resources. By the same token, the persistence in disconnect 
between country’s endowments in factors of production and factor intensities of its exports point 
to major institutional and policy deficiencies in the existing economic regime. 
Exploring a full causal chain linking factor endowments, comparative advantage and 
trade patterns are not relevant for this discussion.
13 The question germane here concerns 
                                                           
13 The goodness of results obtained hinges critically on the quality of a classification used to examine 
export baskets over time by factor mix. The choice is always controversial.  There are woeful difficulties to 
define and measure factor intensity, and trade theorists have long wrestled with it. Special problems emerge 
when a classification aims to capture “quality” of factors involved (Winters 1997). Some definitions of the 
groups of goods by factor intensity are overlapping and non-exhaustive. Definitions used here do not suffer   -  28  -     
assessment of broad changes in relative factor intensities as revealed in Bulgaria’s total exports in 
comparison to other transition economies.  
Historically, under central planning and specialization assigned within the now defunct 
CMEA, Bulgaria’s comparative advantage was ‘planned to be’ in skilled labor and capital 
intensive products. Considering its moderate climate and abundance of fertile soil, Bulgaria’s 
another specialization were agricultural, resource intensive products. Electrical machinery 
accounted for a sizable share of its CMEA-directed exports, albeit not in exports directed to world 
markets where low-processed products and raw materials, industrial and agricultural, were 
dominant. Like other CEEC-10 economies, Bulgaria’s foreign trade was subject to a dual 
regime—administrative and market-oriented. They both overlapped creating ‘policy-induced’ 
comparative advantage.  
However, with the end of the CMEA—trade driven more by politics than economics, this 
pattern of factor intensities of exports was not sustainable at least in the short run. Although 
relative to its GDP per capita Bulgaria had a relatively large pool of high skilled labor, its state-
owned enterprises turning on capital and skilled labor intensive products could not survive 
without infusion of capital and technology. Even with privatization to foreign strategic investors, 
it would take some time before they could be restructured to become competitive in international 
markets. Similarly, earlier specialization in agricultural products was not sustainable. Their 
competitiveness was artificially sustained by subsidized energy and other, implicit and explicit 
subsidies. Again it would take time before reforms of agricultural sector would bring 
indispensable improvements in productivity to withstand competition in world markets. 
For these reasons, one would expect that in the aftermath the collapse of central planning 
and CME trade there would be an initial shift towards unskilled labor intensive products, as it was 
the case in other transition economies, followed by the shift towards agricultural and skilled labor 
intensive products. Over a longer haul, one would, therefore, expect dominance of labor intensive 
and natural resource intensive products in its exports. Given the relatively high quality and degree 
of scientific education in Bulgaria as well as in other Central European countries, Hamilton and 
Winters (1992) pointing to a positive correlation between education and comparative advantage 
in sophisticated engineering goods had predicted a better-than-average performance in skilled 
labor intensive products. Developments several years into transition have substantiated this 
prediction. Unskilled labor intensive products were the major levers of CEEC-3 EU-oriented 
export expansion (Kaminski 1993). 
Bulgaria’s pattern in terms of export intensities has been similar to those observed in 
Central European transition economies but only in 1990-96. The drivers of export growth to the 
EU were initially unskilled labor rather than skilled labor intensive products.
14 Unskilled labor 
intensive industrial products were also the driving force behind Bulgaria’s EU-oriented export 
growth. The value of these exports increased 58 percent between 1991 and 1993 (as compared to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
from these shortcomings--all industries are taken into account and an industry appears only in one 
classification; and the classification distinguishes among four types of factors. Since some industries are 
intensive in terms of more than one factor, the results may be distorted. But even assuming that the initial 
classification captures adequately factor proportions at a given point of time, with the passage of time it 
may provide a distorted picture. Some industries may become more capital-intensive or less active in 
technological terms. 
14 For instance, in Hungary the share of unskilled labor products rose 32 percent over 1989-93 as compared 
to 22 percent and 19 percent change in the share of capital intensive and skilled labor intensive products 
mainly at the expense of a dramatic fall in resource intensive exports (-46 percent). Thereafter, the share of 
unskilled labor fell 36 percent between 1993 and 1997, the share of capital intensive rose 74 percent and 
that of skilled labor intensive products 47 percent.   -  29  -     
a 19-percent increase in total EU-destined exports), and their share rose from 24 percent to 32 
percent. But it fell to 28 percent in 1994. Since the share of unskilled labor intensive products in 
EU-oriented exports of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had also been contracting since 1992-
93, there was nothing unusual about it.
15 
However, while 1992-93 witnessed what turned out to be historically peak levels of the 
shares of unskilled labor intensive products in EU-oriented exports from these countries, Bulgaria’s 
pattern has been diverging. The 1994-96 witnessed a major realignment in the export growth 
pattern, with skilled labor and capital intensive products emerging as major levers of Bulgaria’s 
export expansion, turned out not to be sustainable (Figure 4).
16  

































Source: Based on EU Data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Bulgaria’s pattern in terms of export intensities has become a complete reversal of 
patterns observed in Hungary or Poland as well as in other transition economies in that period. 
This was a repetition of the patterns observed during the initial stages, albeit on a much larger 
scale, as the share of unskilled labor intensive products rapidly expanded to levels well above the 
earlier peak in 1993 and their expansion extended over a much longer period of time. The share 
of both skilled labor and capital intensive products in Bulgaria’s EU exports after increases in 
1994-95 has subsequently, whereas unskilled labor intensive drove Bulgaria’s exports until 2001, 
with their share rising to 40 percent and stabilizing at this level. 
Bulgaria’s idiosyncratic factor intensities extended to total exports still in 1996 (first year 
for which reliable foreign trade data are available). Given the relative endowments in capital 
across regional peers, one would not expect such a significant presence of capital intensive 
products in Bulgaria’s total exports. Yet, the share of capital intensive products was higher in 
Bulgaria’s exports than in total exports of all other comparators in 1996 (Table 21). This may 
come as no surprise vis-à-vis SEE-4, but it is rather startling when cast against much more 
developed CEEC-8 economies taken as a bloc. The share in CEEC-8 exports was four percentage 
points lower than in Bulgaria’s, while the share of unskilled labor products four percentage points 
larger. In a similar vein, unskilled labor intensive products had much larger presence in both 
Croatian and Romanian exports than in Bulgaria’s. 
                                                           
15 See the calculations reported in World Bank 1999. 
16 The value of total EU-oriented exports increased 85 percent in 1993-96. The value of skilled labor 
intensive products quadrupled and that of capital intensive exports. Simultaneously, the share of unskilled 
labor intensive declined   -  30  -     
Table 21: The differences between Bulgaria’s exports and other CEEC- and SEE-economies in terms of 
factor intensities in 1996, 2000 and 2003 (in percentage points and in percent) 
   1996    2000    2003  
  NR  UL CI SL NR  UL CI SL NR  UL CI SL 
CEEC-8 -12.1  4.3  -3.9 8.2 -16.6 -9.3 10.6 13.8 -16.4 -15.2  14.6  16.3 
Of  which:  Lithuania 5.5 3.1  -6.4 -2.2 8.5 -1.1 -1.5 -5.8 6.1 -3.7  -0.7  -1.7 
Croatia  -4.9  17.9 -4.2 -8.8 -1.9 7.2 1.8 -7.1 -5.0 1.4  7.6 -4.0 
Romania -15.0  21.9  -8.4 1.5 -12.9 14.2 -0.1 -1.1 -11.3 8.3  0.1  2.9 
SEE-4 17.1  2.0  -15.8 -5.3 9.0 -2.6 -10.0 2.4 13.9 -7.7  -7.5  0.1 
Memorandum: Share in percent in Bulgaria's total exports       
Bulgaria  37.7 17.1 28.3 16.9 35.2 27.1 21.5 16.2 34.0 32.2 18.9 14.9 
Notes: NR—natural resource intensive products; UL-unskilled labor intensive products; CI-capital intensive products; SL-
skilled labor intensive products. SEE-4 countries include Albania, Macedonia, Moldova and Serbia and Montenegro. 
Because of lack of data, Bosnian and Herzegovina is not included.  
Source: Derived from countries’ data in UN COMTRADE database. 
The 1996-2003 period has seen shifts in factor content of Bulgaria’s exports vis-à-vis its 
regional peers that in most CEEC-8 took place during the initial stages of transition in 1991-95. 
First, exports of CEEC-8 moved towards capital intensive products: their share was 11 percentage 
points higher than in Bulgaria’s exports in 2000 and rose further to 15 percentage points in 2003. 
Similar change has occurred in skilled labor intensive products, with the gap widening from 8 
percentage points in 1996 to 16 percentage points in 2003. This shift is also visible when 
compared with Lithuania, an economy with a heavy presence of natural resource intensive 
exports. Lithuania moved between 1996 and 2003 away from unskilled labor intensive exports to 
capital and skilled labor intensive products in comparison to Bulgaria.  
Second, the difference in relative factor intensities vis-à-vis its northern neighbor, 
Romania, has narrowed mainly as a result of the growth in Bulgaria’s exports of unskilled labor 
intensive product and the fall in the share of skilled labor intensive products in total exports. 
Romania’s export basket has moved more towards capital and skilled labor intensive products in 
comparison with Bulgaria. Last but not least, SEE-4 exports moved between 2000 and 2003 
relative to Bulgaria’s exports towards natural resource intensive products. 
Data in Table 22 provide another set of insights based on dynamics of total exports.  
Lithuania’s export basket in terms of relative factor intensities was the closest to that of Bulgaria 
in the 1996-2003 period. In Lithuania’s exports, however, the share of natural resource and 
unskilled labor intensive was slightly larger in 1996. The situation changed already in 2000 
indicating growing differences in the dynamics of exports in terms of their factor intensities, 
although among European transition economies Lithuania’s composition of exports has remained 
the most similar to that of Bulgaria.  
Table 22: Change in shares and dynamics of total exports in comparative perspective in 1996-2003 (in 
percent) 
 
Index, 2000;  
1996=100 
Index 2003;  
2000=100 
Memorandum: Index of total exports 
in 2000 and 2003 in terms of value 
  NR  UL CI SL NR  UL CI SL  1996=100  2000=100 
Bulgaria  93  158  76 96 97 119 88 92   99  156 
CEEC-8 (2004 EU)  73  83  132 119 95 95 104 104 142  164 
Of  which:  Lithuania 101 128  92 70 92 110 91 127 113  188 
Croatia  102 98 97 111 87 98 113 121     91  139 
Romania  98 106 108 81 102 98 89 119 128  170 
SEE-4  81  128  93 160 109 100 98 81   97  130 
Notes: NR—natural resource intensive; UL—unskilled labor intensive; CI—capital intensive; SL—skilled labor intensive 
Source: Derived from countries’ data in UN COMTRADE database. 
However, change in shares and dynamics of total exports shows that (a) Lithuania 
experienced a stronger growth in both periods and (b) exports of skilled labor products replaced   -  31  -     
unskilled labor products as the major levers of Lithuanian export expansion. In contrast, unskilled 
labor intensive products were the best performers in Bulgarian exports. In both periods, the shares 
of capital intensive and skilled labor intensive products in total exports of CEEC-8 increased 
whereas they fell in Bulgarian exports. Croatia’s exports, except for much slower overall growth, 
displayed similar change as CEEC-8. 
While this should come as no surprise considering Bulgaria’s two, rather than one, 
transformational recessions, the comparison with Romania, which has also gone through them, 
raises concerns. Growth in Romania’s exports was much more robust in 1996-2003 exceeding in 
2000-03 the increase in CEEC-8 exports. But more importantly, skilled labor intensive products 
replaced capital intensive and unskilled labor intensive products as main levers of impressive 
growth in 2000-03. Both Bulgaria’s and Romania’s performance, differences between them 
notwithstanding, diverged from that of SEE-4, where natural resource intensive products were 
behind their overall rebound in exports in 2000-03. 
C.  What do developments in trade with the EU say about labor markets? 
While a comprehensive answer to this question would require a detailed analysis of the 
labor market itself, the evidence from developments in the factor intensity of Bulgaria’s trade 
with the EU suggests that the cost of labor relative to capital is low. On the other hand, however, 
the country’s double-digit unemployment rate would seem to reflect the relatively high labor cost. 
Since wage rates are low, this in turn would suggest high cost of compliance with labor market 
regulations, which effectively makes labor much more expensive than wage rates alone would 
suggest. Although Bulgaria’s export basket reflects the abundance of cheap labor, high 
unemployment rates would point to barriers preventing full exploitation of this potential. While 
some of them maybe related to distance and weaknesses in services linking domestic markets 
with international markets, other stem from domestic rigidities. 
Labor market rigidities appear to account for the continuing high share of inter-industry 
type of trade in Bulgaria’s foreign trade. Despite change in the dynamics of exports towards more 
processed, higher value added products, Bulgaria’s trade still exhibits many features of the 
traditional division of labor linking developing and highly developed countries through 
exchanges of raw materials and low-processed goods for processed ones. Bulgaria specializes in 
the export of production inputs. Excluding clothing, agricultural raw materials and industrial 
inputs regarded as traditional production inputs, that is, not processed in their present form, have 
consistently accounted for half of EU-destined total exports minus clothing, while highly 
processed manufactures have dominated in imports from the EU. Although manufactures amount 
to more than three-fourths of Bulgaria’s sales in EU markets, half of these are relatively low 
value-added items such as clothing and footwear. 
Labor market rigidities appear to be responsible also for a high presence of unskilled 
labor intensive products, again clothing dominant among them, in Bulgaria’s exports at the 
expense of skilled-labor-intensive products. Considering that wage differentials between the EU-
15 and CEEC-10 tend to be much higher in favor of the former for skilled labor, one might expect 
a more pronounced presence of skilled-labor-intensive products in EU-oriented exports. In other 
words, skilled labor intensive activities should have attracted capital, foreign and domestic alike. 
Labor market rigidities raising the cost of labor appear to have erected the barrier to allocation of 
capital to these areas. 
Considering the prolonged period of FDI inflows well above five percent in terms of 
GDP as well as the increase in investment levels in the Bulgarian economy, an interesting 
question is the extent to which apparent labor market rigidities continue to distort investment 
flows as captured in their impact on exports.   -  32  -     
D. Factors’ content and emerging patterns of specialization in EU markets 
 The share of the EU in Bulgaria’s trade has been growing since the collapse of central 
planning. Sales in EU markets have largely determined Bulgaria’s overall export performance. 
Several questions arise in this context: What products in terms of factor intensities have driven 
this expansion? How firmly entrenched are they in EU markets?  
The anomaly of Bulgaria’s export performance in terms of factor intensities, that is, 
relatively weak growth of unskilled labor exports, disappeared during the crisis phase of 1997-99, 
with exports of both capital and skilled labor intensive products significantly retracting. While the 
1996-99 period sets Bulgaria apart from other CEEC-10 in terms of prolonged stagnation in EU-
oriented exports, the emergence of unskilled labor intensive product as the only ‘growth’ group 
was similar to trends observed in other CEEC-10 economies during the initial stages of transition. 
Unskilled labor intensive products, mainly clothing, were the only exports that consistently grew 
in terms of value over 1997-99 with an average annual rate of 7 percent. Their share in total EU-
destined exports grew from 24 percent in 1995 to 38 percent mainly at the expense of capital and 
skilled labor intensive products, whose aggregate share declined from 39 percent to 29 percent 
(Table 23). Reflecting differences in endowment in production factors between the EU and 
Bulgaria, Bulgaria’s exports of both natural resource and unskilled labor intensive products were 
significantly larger than their imports from the EU. 
Table 23: Dynamics of EU-oriented exports in terms of factor intensities (in percent) 
  Average growth rate  Change in share in exports  Change in share in EU imports 
  (in current US dollars)  Index, 1996 Index 1999 Index 2003 Index, 1996  Index 1999  Index 2003
 1991-96  1997-99  2000-03 1991=100 1997=100 2000=100 1991=100 1997=100 2000=100
Natural Resource  11.3  -1.1    7.5    78    98    89  143  106  114 
Unskilled  Labor  21.4  7.3  14.1  120 124 113 199 113 129 
Capital Intensive  20.3  -8.1  10.1  114    78    98  176    65  136 
Skilled Labor  20.2  -5.1    8.7  114    86    93  197    71  100 
All above goods  17.1  -0.3  10.5  N/a  N/a  N/a  168  91  126 
Source: Based on EU Data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Notwithstanding differences in dynamics, Bulgaria’s specialization profile, as captured 
by export specialization (ES) indices,
17 has remained unchanged during transition. Bulgaria has 
had “revealed comparative advantage” in unskilled labor and natural resource intensive products 
in EU markets. Except for natural resource intensive products in 1996-97 and 2001, the values of 
ES for both groups have been above unity in 1991-2003 (Table 24). However, the intensity of 
specialization in unskilled labor intensive products in EU markets has been very strong, whereas 
that in natural resource intensive products has been much weaker and declining.  
The changes in the shares of factor intensity groups in EU external imports over 1991-
2003 further corroborate these observations. Bulgarian producers of unskilled intensive products 
have consistently outperformed their competitors from other countries and seen their share in EU 
imports growing almost each year over 1991-2003. Performance of natural intensive producers in 
Bulgarian was rather lackluster. Their share in EU external imports exceeded its 1995 peak level 
of the 1990’s only in 2002-03 and only by three percentage points. Producers of both skilled labor 
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(xij/Xi) /(mj/M),  where:  xij is country i’s exports of product j to the EU; Xi = Σj xij is country i’s total 
exports to the EU; Mj = Σj xij is EU’s total ‘external’ imports of a product j;  M = Σi Σj xij is EU’s total 
external imports. A value for this index below unity indicates a comparative disadvantage.  If the index takes 
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intensive and capital intensive products lost shares in EU external imports. Despite gains in 2002-
03, the share of capital labor intensive products in EU imports stood at 67 percent of its peak 
level in 1995 and that of capital intensive products at 89 percent (Table 7). Moreover, the share of 
skilled labor intensive products in EU imports fell from 0.33 percent in 2001 to 0.27 in 2002 and 
slightly rebounded to 0.29 percent in 2003. 
Table 24: EU-oriented exports in terms of factor intensities in 1991-2003(in millions of US dollars and 
percent) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Export To EU (in Millions of $)       
Natural  Resource  422 520 494 680 885 721 771 776 746 962 899 982  1,285
Unskilled  Labor  241 378 381 463 572 636 728 862 899 1,002  1,252  1,299  1,696
Capital  Intensive  193 206 220 343 484 486 472 417 367 458 481 492 674
Skilled  Labor  133 150  83 201 449 335 404 462 345 394 466 397 550
All  above  goods  989 1,254 1,179 1,687 2,390 2,178 2,376 2,518 2,357 2,816 3,099 3,170 4,205
Export Share (%)         
Natural  Resource  42.6 41.4 41.9 40.3 37.0 33.1 32.5 30.8 31.7 34.2 29.0 31.0 30.6
Unskilled  Labor  24.3 30.2 32.3 27.5 23.9 29.2 30.7 34.3 38.1 35.6 40.4 41.0 40.3
Capital  Intensive  19.5 16.4 18.7 20.3 20.2 22.3 19.9 16.6 15.6 16.3 15.5 15.5 16.0
Skilled  Labor  13.5 12.0  7.0 11.9 18.8 15.4 17.0 18.4 14.7 14.0 15.0 12.5 13.1
As percent of EU External Imports     
Natural  Resource  0.20 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.37
Unskilled  Labor  0.30 0.43 0.45 0.52 0.57 0.60 0.65 0.73 0.74 0.79 0.97 0.96 1.01
Capital  Intensive  0.10 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16
Skilled  Labor  0.16 0.17 0.10 0.23 0.43 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.26 0.29  0.33  0.27 0.29
All  above  goods  0.17 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.35 0.37
Export Specialization Index     
Natural Resource  1.14 1.15 1.19 1.16 1.08 0.96 0.98 1.09 1.14 1.11  0.94  1.05 1.00
Unskilled Labor  1.73 2.03 2.09 1.86 1.71 2.05 2.09 2.32 2.60 2.65 2.87 2.73 2.71
Capital  Intensive  0.58 0.49 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.60 0.53 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.43
Skilled  Labor  0.92 0.78 0.47 0.81 1.28 1.08 1.16 1.14 0.91 0.96 0.99 0.76 0.76
Exports in percent of imports     
Natural  Resource  139 149 103 130 155 166 175 148 162 192 159 175 156
Unskilled  Labor  167 160 123 136 124 144 144 142 144 141 144 130 130
Capital  Intensive  34 33 42 50 60 72 77 49 36 45 37 34 36
Skilled  Labor  46 39 21 42 59 58 85 74 56 63 64 48 48
All  above  goods  75 79 69 83 92 102 117 97 87 99 90 83 82
Source: Based on EU Data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
The aggregates, however, do not allow determining the extent to which the reduction in 
distortions generated by economic reforms has triggered the process of relocation of resources to 
new lines of production. A different picture emerges from the analysis of export growth and 
changes in shares in EU external imports at four-digit SITC Rev. 2 level. Table 25 presents the 
composition of Bulgarian EU-oriented exports of products whose share in EU imports grew at 
least at an average annual growth of 30 percent amounting at a minimum to 2.85-fold increase in 
this share in 2003 over 2000. 141 four-digit SITC items, accounting in 2003 for 16 percent of 
Bulgaria’s EU-destined exports, met this criterion. Their exports grew on average at 58 percent 
per year in 2000-03. 
Table 25: Composition of ‘most dynamic’ EU-oriented exports and rates of growth in 2000-03 (in percent) 
         Total EU-exports Average rate of growth 
 2000  2001 2002 2003  2003  per year in 2000-03 
Natural Resource Intensive   33.4  33.9 47.6 30.5  30.6  54.5 
Unskilled Labor Intensive 16.7  13.9 13.5 15.9  40.3  56.2 
Capital Intensive  42.0 45.4 33.3 47.0  16.0  62.6 
Skilled Labor Intensive   7.9  6.9  5.7  6.7  13.1  51.3 
Memorandum:        
Share in EU-oriented exports 3.8 8.5  15.4 15.9  100  58.1 
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Not all products among 141 high performers are new exports, although they appear to 
come from restructured production capacities. In fact, most of them were exported before 2000-
03 and often enjoyed significant presence in EU markets as measured by shares in EU external 
import demand. All of them, however, saw their shares plunging in 1996-99 and subsequently 
fortunes reversed in 2000-03. While in 1997-98 four four-digit SITC products had the share in 
EU external imports exceeding 2 percent, their number fell to one in 1999-2000, and increased to 
8 in 2001, 14 in 2002 and 15 in 2003. These were not tiny exports in terms of value. The number 
of products with the value of exports exceeding US$ 5 million rose from between five and seven 
in 1996-2000 to 13 in 2001, 22 in 2002 and 32 in 2003. 
How does the composition of these exports in terms of factor content intensities compare 
to the composition of Bulgaria’s total EU-oriented exports in 2003? The most striking difference 
is much lower share of unskilled labor intensive products among ‘fast growers’ and a much larger 
share of capital intensive products. The differences are staggering especially for the latter 
accounting for almost half of fast growers in 2003. Among capital intensive products machinery 
(SITC 7) emerged as the major driver accounting for 36 percent of fast growers’ EU-destined 
exports. 
Hence, it appears that the process of industrial restructuring has been going on and only 
now begins to influence overall export performance. In line with trends observed in other CEEC-
10 economies, capital intensive products have been emerging as the levers of export growth.  
E. Factors content of EU-oriented exports and level of technology 
Examination of Bulgaria’s export offer in terms of technologies embodied in Bulgaria’s 
products exported to the EU provide further evidence pointing to, on the one hand, the dominance 
of low-tech labor intensive products and signs of ongoing modernization of Bulgaria’s industrial 
base. We use a simple classification, developed by Landesman and Stehrer (2003), filtering 
Bulgaria’s export oriented into three broad categories: (1) low technology and labor intensive 
activities, (2) resource intensive activities, and (3) medium- to high-technology production 
activities. In contrast to its earlier application (see Section 3.C), we include resource intensive 
products, and we do not restrict the analysis to manufactures but include all other products—
industrial and agricultural alike. Resource intensive sectors consist of manmade fibers, wood and 
wood products, coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels, mineral products, and 
chemicals. 
Table 26: Composition of exports by the type of technology involved in their production, their share and 
export specialization index and their changes in 1996-2003 (in percent) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Change   Index,  1999 Index  2003 
Share in Bulgaria's EU-oriented exports  in 2003  1996=100  2000=100 
Low-tech labor intensive  40.9  41.6  43.8 46.4 39.9 45.2 47.5 44.8 -5.8  113  112 
Resource intensive  36.9  37.7  35.9 31.0 37.8 30.8 25.3 26.1 3.2  84  69 
Medium- to high tech  13.5  11.2  12.6 16.0 13.9 14.4 17.8 19.1 7.2  119  137 
Share in EU external imports         
Low-tech labor intensive  0.59  0.65  0.71 0.73 0.76 0.91 0.97 1.02 4.6  123  134 
Resource intensive  0.68  0.73  0.69 0.58 0.76 0.70 0.60 0.68 13.1  85  89 
Medium- to high tech  0.33  0.27  0.28 0.35 0.31 0.34 0.42 0.44 5.7  106  144 
Export Specialization in EU markets       
Low-tech labor intensive  2.06  2.14  2.28 2.62 2.57 2.80 2.81 2.74 -2.5  128  106 
Resource intensive  2.35  2.40  2.21 2.07 2.58 2.14 1.73 1.82 5.4  88  71 
Medium- to high tech  0.09  0.08  0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.16 13.3  102  182 
Source: Own calculations based on EU-15 trade data reported to the UN COMTRADE database. 
As expected, the specialization profile in EU markets, as obtained through running the 
trade data through the above discussed “technology” filter, does not diverge overall from the 
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intensive activities, which clearly dominate accounting for around 80 percent of Bulgaria’s EU-
oriented exports (Table 26 above). 
Yet, a closer examination sheds new light on trends identified earlier providing an extra 
evidence supporting the observation about Bulgaria’s exports moving to more value-added and 
technology intensive activities. Note first that medium to high technology products recorded the 
largest in terms of value in 2000-03. They also registered the largest gains in share in EU external 
imports as well as in export specialization, albeit the latter have a long way to dominance in 
Bulgaria’s specialization profile.  
F. Concluding observations 
Bulgaria appears to have been losing features of its export performance that have set its 
patterns of specialization aside from other CEEC-9 transition economies since 1996. Empirical 
analysis in this section provides evidence in support of the following observations: First, while 
the 1996-2000 witnessed little or no gains in overall competitiveness of Bulgarian producers in 
world markets, except for clothing mainly in EU markets, there was a significant increase in the 
presence of Bulgarian exporters in the most recent period, especially in 2003.  
Second, the gap between CEEC-8 economies and Bulgaria in terms of export 
performance and its factor embodiments appears to be closing, albeit slowly. The emergence of 
capital- and skilled labor-intensive products as drivers of Bulgaria’s EU-oriented exports between 
1994 and Bulgaria’s second transformational recession in 1996-97 was not only in defiance of 
patterns observed in other CEEC-10 but also was the result of distortions imputed by economic 
regime overtaken by narrow private interests.  Although in 1996-99 the situation reversed itself, 
i.e., while capital- and skilled-labor intensive products have replaced unskilled labor intensive 
products as drivers of CEEC-8 as well as Romania’s exports, unskilled labor intensive products 
towered Bulgaria’s exports.  
Although this pattern of specialization largely continued through 2000-03, there are 
indications of the ongoing shift towards patterns typical of other CEEC-10. Among emerging fast 
growers, i.e., products whose exports growth exceeded annual changes in EU import demand by 
at least 30 percent in 2000-03, capital intensive products have stood out. In the same vein, the 
degree of processing embodied in Bulgaria’s exports has been on the increase, with the share of 
manufactures in total exports rapidly growing and the share of traditional production inputs 
declining. Exports of clothing, although still accounting for around one-fourth of Bulgaria’s total 
exports, are no longer the only bright spot in Bulgaria’s overall export performance, as it was the 
case in 1996-99. Exports of electrical machinery have begun emerging as the top performers in 
world markets.  
Hence, a shift, similar to that earlier observed in other CEEC-10 economies, towards 
gaining competitiveness in capital and skilled labor intensive products appears to be underway. It 
appears that the process of realignment in allocation of resources in response to economic 
opening has begun impacting Bulgaria’s export basket. Capital and labor have been moving to 
more sophisticated and higher value added activities and more processed goods with higher 
content of capital and skilled labor have been expanding faster than traditional inputs and 
unskilled labor intensive products. The challenge for policy makers is to sustain this healthy 
transformation better reflecting Bulgaria’s relative competitive strengths. 
5.  Integration into EU production structures: participation in EU-driven value 
chains 
The combination of technology and business friendly and efficient services environment 
has spurred a new global division of labor. Its trademark is dividing up the value chain into 
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lower. Production fragmentation in vertically integrated sectors is behind ‘producer-driven’ 
network trade. It differs in several important respects from traditional, ‘buyer-driven’ global value 
chains. It includes two-way flows of parts and components across firms located in various 
countries for further processing and development. A historical example of production 
fragmentation at a regional level is the Canada-United States Automotive Products Agreement of 
1965, which, followed by the significant reduction in trade barriers, led to an expansion of trade 
in auto parts (Jones et al. 2004). 
International production and distribution networks, also known as global commodity 
chains resulting in production fragmentation due to dividing the value chain of production into 
smaller operations, refer to activities involved in the design, production and marketing of a 
product. One may distinguish between ‘buyer-driven’ and ‘producer-driven’ value chains. The 
former denotes the case of global buyers creating a supply-base upon which production and 
distribution systems are built without direct ownership. The latter refers to vertically integrated 
arrangements. To be sure, this classification does not exhaust all possible venues of participation 
in global networks. 
‘Buyer-driven’ commodity chains tend to exist in industries in which large retailers, 
branded marketers and branded manufacturers play the pivotal roles in setting up decentralized 
production networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically in developing or transition 
economies.  This pattern has become common in labor-intensive, consumer goods sectors, such as 
apparel, footwear, etc. Our focus will be on three buyer-driven chains: textiles and clothing (TC); 
footwear; and furniture. The latter differs especially from TC value chains, as it involves 
operations that tend to be more diversified and complex requiring larger local input of skills and 
investment in capital assets. Similarly to clothing and footwear, furniture producers operating in a 
global value chain supply products according to specification provided by large multinational 
retailers. They also tend to be locally owned, but the relationship between supplier and 
multinational retailer frequently reflect larger complexity of tasks involved. In consequence, their 
relationship is based on a more long-term mutual commitment, which is less sensitive to the rise 
in labor costs and creates more opportunities for spillovers. 
‘Producer-driven’ commodity chains are those in which large multinational corporations 
play a central role in coordinating the production process. They are mainly present in capital- and 
skilled-labor-intensive industries such as automobiles, computers, semiconductors and heavy 
machinery. Automotive and information and communication technology (IR) represent the most 
dynamic ‘producer-driven’ networks. While outsourcing in clothing, footwear or furniture has 
rarely been accompanied by significant inflows of FDI, although there have been exceptions, the 
entry into supply chains of automotive and IT networks is almost inconceivable without MNCs 
bringing capital, technology and marketing. As MNCs drive trade in these two networks, it will 
be referred to as “MNC-driven” network trade.
18  
Network trade has been the driving force of CEEC-10 economies’ integration into global 
markets. The most developed of them have moved through two stages. First, ‘buyer-driven’ 
network exports have been the first major vehicle linking them to external markets. The point of 
departure has been as a rule inward processing in relatively technologically simple and capital 
non-intensive activities such clothing often followed and/or accompanied in transition economies 
by footwear and furniture.  
The second stage has been participation in ‘producer-driven’ networks. Engagement in 
global networks in electronics or automotive industry usually comes at higher stages of economic 
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development. It marks moving to a new division of labor based on production fragmentation. As 
the experience from other countries indicates, foreign investments are crucial to overcome this 
barrier. The link between the FDI and network trade seems to be ubiquitous for ‘producer-driven’ 
network trade. Two largest recipients of FDI—the Czech Republic and Hungary—have been also 
the best performers in ‘producer-driven’ network exports. On the other hand, although 
participation in furniture or clothing global chains does not necessarily require foreign 
investments, it is often associated with FDI. A good example is Romania’s clothing sector, 
characterized by much higher foreign penetration than in other CEECs (Hunya 2002, p. 391). A 
large number of small Italian firms appear to dominate both clothing and leather industries in 
Romania (Kaminski, Ng 2004).  
This section examines Bulgaria’s place in evolving division of labor driven regionally by 
EU Eastern Enlargement Project. It assesses participation of Bulgarian firms in global chains 
organized around the EU-15 but also increasingly encompassing some recent EU entrants, mainly 
Hungary and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic that are becoming regional intermediaries in 
‘producer-driven’ networks (Kaminski 2005). 
A. Participation in ‘buyer-driven’ value chains: clothing, footwear and furniture 
Clothing and, to a lesser extent, footwear have been the quintessential engines of growth 
for many CEEC-10 during the initial stages of transition. They have accounted for a significant 
share of value added and manufacturing employment, with consequential implications for poverty 
reduction. With increasing wages in successful reformers, many of outward processing operations 
in the clothing sector have been shifting to economies less advanced in the transformation process 
to take advantage of lower labor costs in to other countries in Central and South East Europe 
through the 1990s. The dates when their share in exports of manufactures peaked indicates the 
end of TC operations as engines of export growth. For Bulgaria and Romania as well as other 
SEE-4 economies, their share peaked only in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s (Table 
27). In all of them, exports of other manufactures have begun outpacing TC exports. 
Table 27: Share of clothing in exports of manufactured goods excluding chemicals in 1992-2002 
(in percent) 
  Peak  Share in  Share in 2003  Index, 2003 Average annual growth rate
  year  peak year  or latest available peak=100  1996-2003 
Hungary 1992  21.2  4.1  20  3.8 
Slovenia 1993  13.8  3.5  25  -7.5 
Poland 1993  18.9  5.2  27  -1.9 
Czech Republic  1994  3.8  1.8  46  2.2 
Estonia 1995  14.1  7.3  52  8.4 
Slovak Republic  1997  7.3  3.9  54  14.7 
Croatia 1997  25.8  15.5  60  -0.9 
Albania 1998  48.5  41.1  85  17.2 
Serbia & Montenegro  1998  18.7  14.5  78  -4.4 
Latvia 1999  20.4  16.0  78  9.7 
Lithuania 1999  27.7  16.6  60  12.0 
Romania 1999  32.8  29.8  91  18.5 
Macedonia  2002  46.4  44.9       97   7.3 
Bulgaria  2002  34.8    34.0        98                    21.2 
Source: Own calculations based on national trade statistics reported to the UN COMTRADE database. 
Bulgaria became part of TC value chains much later than other CEEC-10, but it has 
caught up very quickly. Since 1996 Bulgaria has been very successful in tapping opportunities 
offered by outward processing mostly by EU firms of garments. With the average annual rate of 
growth of 21 percent, it recorded the fastest growth over 1996-2003 among CEEC-10 and SEE-4   -  38  -     
economies.
19 This was also the fastest growing value chain among buyer-driven chains, with its 
share in total EU-oriented exports increasing from 78 percent in 1996 to 83 percent in 2000. In 
2001-03, exports of both footwear and furniture chain products and parts grew faster than TC 
exports. The share of TC in total ‘buyer-driven’ network exports fell to 80 percent in 2003, while 
that of footwear to 14 percent up from 12 percent in 2000 and that of furniture to 6 percent up 
from 5 percent.  
Entry of Bulgarian firms into ‘buyer-driven’ value chains has been significantly delayed 
in comparison to other CEEC-10 economies and except for TC chain, no other chain has emerged 
as a lever of Bulgaria’s export growth. In fact, until 2001 exports of both footwear and furniture 
chains remained stagnant. Exports of footwear grew in line with total EU-oriented exports, with 
their share in Bulgaria’s exports at around 5 percent (Table 28). Furniture network had the 
strongest growth between 2001 and 2003, with the value of its exports almost doubling. 
How competitive have producers from ‘buyer-driven’ networks been in EU markets? 
Exporters of products and parts of ‘buyer-driven’ chains have been competitive in EU markets, as 
their respective shares in EU external imports increased rather significantly especially in 2000-03 
for furniture and footwear producers. Their share in EU external imports grew consistently 
through 1996-99 mainly because of impressive performance of TC network towering over exports 
from other ‘buyer-driven’ chains. While the growth in share of Bulgarian TC products in EU 
imports remained roughly the same of around 7-8 percent per year during both the 1996-99 
stagnation and 2000-03 expansionary phases, exporters of products of other chains did not make 
any significant in-roads in EU markets in 1996-2000. The share of footwear in EU imports was in 
2003 38 percent higher than in 2000 and that of furniture products 37 percent higher. In both 
networks, producers of parts have outperformed suppliers of final products in terms of gains in 
market share. The same applies to TC network, with textiles registering much stronger gain (95 
percent) than clothing (25 percent over 2000). Exporters of parts saw their share increase 73 
percent between 2001 and 2003 (Table 28). 
The shift towards parts is indicative that Bulgaria ceases to be mostly an assembly shop 
for EU firms taking advantage of available cheap labor force. While without the survey of firms 
in sectors or access to input-output tables it is impossible to give an unambiguous answer to this 
assessment, an examination of trade data tabulated in Table 15 offers some clues. Developments 
within each chain suggest slightly different answers. While data point to the development of 
backward linkages in footwear and furniture chains, no clear conclusion can be drawn in 
reference to TC value chain. 
The TC at first involves cut-make-trim (CMT) tasks, possibly followed by a move to 
FOB, i.e., firm providing the fabric itself and charging for the final garment rather than earning 
only a processing fee. The ability to shift to FOB critically depends on the price and quality of 
domestically available fabrics. Their absence weakens competitiveness of domestic producers. 
The TC trade data do not suggest the fall in import intensity, the share of imported fabrics in total 
TC exports, which usually accompanies the shift to FOB operations. Yet, it would be impossible 
to conclude that (a) there is shortage of domestically available high quality fabrics and (b) that 
simple CMT operations continue to expand in the Bulgarian garment sector. Consider the 
following: The importance of imported inputs for final exports, as measured by imports of textiles 
as percent of exports of clothing and textiles, slightly increased in TC chain from 50 percent in 
2000-01 to 55 percent in 2002-03. While no firm conclusions can be drawn on the basis of such a 
crude measure, this may suggest lack of significant progress in the development of backward 
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linkages. But this conclusion is tentative at best. This share is significantly lower than in 
Romanian TC chain (67 percent in 2002), although in the latter it has been on the decline. The 
increase in the share of textiles in TC exports, which, after the contraction from 16 percent in 
1996 to 8 percent in 2000, strongly rebounded to 12 percent in 2003, suggests the availability of 
high quality fabrics in Bulgaria. Last but not least, imported fabrics may be used for producing 
more processed fabrics for exports. 
Table 28: Trade with the EU in ‘buyer-driven’ chains in 1996-2003 (in millions of US dollars 
and percent) 
  .  Change 
2003 
Product  (SITC Revision 2)  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003 over 2001
A. Textiles and Clothing (SITC 65+8998 and 84):       
Total exports of Textiles & Clothing ($ million)  471 557 686 697 793 997  993  1,309  31% 
Share of textiles in total T&C exports (%)  15.5 14.4 12.8 9.8 8.0 8.7  12.2  12.0  38% 
Imports of textiles ($ million)  236 282 321 339 395 497  548  726  46% 
Share of textiles in imports of T&C (%)  72 69.9 67.5 68.5 68.1 68.5  65.8  66.0  -4% 
Imports of textiles as % of exports of T&C (%)  50.2 50.6 46.8 48.7 49.7 49.8  55.2  55.4  11% 
Memo Items:       
Share of T&C in Bulgaria's total exports (%)  21.4 23.1 27.0 29.3 27.9 32.0  30.2  30.5  -5% 
Share of EU in Bulgaria's total T&C exports (%)  79.2 78.1 80.5 81.4 80.3 79.1  76.9  76.7  -3% 
Share in EU external imports of T&C (%)  0.74 0.84 0.98 1.01 1.14 1.41  1.35  1.49  6% 
of which: textiles 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.12  0.16  0.18  46% 
Clothing 0.63 0.72 0.86 0.91 1.05 1.29 1.18  1.31  2% 
B. Footwear and parts (SITC 85 and 6123)       
Total exports of Footwear & Parts ($ million)  103 128 121 111 116 161  172  222  38% 
Share of parts in total footwear & parts exports (%)  41.3 39.4 37.7 38.8 43 43.1  48.9  45.4  5% 
Imports of footwear parts ($ million) 36.0 39.6 37.5 39.6 43.4 61.2  56.9  75.0  23% 
Share of parts in imports of footwear & parts (%)  76.2 74.5 74.4 80.4 85.7 89  87.5  87.3  -2% 
Imports of parts as % of exports of footwear & parts (%)  35.0 31.1 31.1 35.9 37.6 38  33.1 33.8  -11% 
Memo Items:       
Share of footwear & parts in Bulgaria's total exports (%)  4.7 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.1 5.2  5.2  5.2  0% 
Share of EU in Bulgaria's exports of footwear & parts (%)  92.9 91.8 91.5 93.6 92.4 90.7  88.1  90.2  -1% 
Share in EU external imports of footwear & parts (in %)  1.28 1.45 1.40 1.22 1.22 1.55  1.56  1.68  8% 
of which:  parts 0.53 0.57 0.53 0.47 0.52 0.67  0.76  0.76  14% 
Footwear 0.75 0.88 0.87 0.74 0.69 0.88 0.79  0.92  4% 
C. Furniture and parts        
Total exports of Furniture & Parts ($ million)  28.7 30.8 32.8 44.3 47.5 53.8  71.4  100.4  86% 
Share of parts in total furniture & parts exports (%)  18.0 19.6 21.5 25.7 25.6 23.8  23.8  27.5  16% 
Imports of furniture parts ($ million)  5.9 5.6 7.4 7.6 6.1 7.8  7.9  11.9  54% 
Share of parts in imports of furniture & parts (%)  20.7 22.9 26.1 28.2 22.3 27.0  26.6  29.9  11% 
Imports of parts as % of exports of furniture & parts (%)  20.7 18.1 22.6 17.0 12.8 14.4 11.0  11.9  -18% 
Memo Items:       
Share of furniture & parts in Bulgaria's total exports (%)  1.30 1.28 1.29 1.86 1.67 1.73  2.17  2.34  36% 
Share of EU in Bulgaria's exports of furniture & parts (%)  76.7 78.2 75.3 73.7 69.3 72.8  69.7  69.7  -4% 
Share in EU external imports of furniture & parts (in %)  0.41 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.49  0.58  0.61  27% 
of which:  parts 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.12  0.14  0.17  46% 
final products 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.33 0.37  0.44  0.45  20% 
D. Total 'Buyer-Driven' value chains       
Share of above exports in Bulgaria's total exports (%)  27.4 29.7 33.1 35.8 33.7 38.9  37.6  38.0  -2% 
Share of EU exports of chains' products and parts (%)  81.1 80.3 81.7 82.4 81 80.2  77.8  77.8  -3% 
Share in EU external imports of furniture & parts (in %)  0.77 0.87 0.97 0.97 1.06 1.31  1.27  1.39  6% 
of which: parts 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.18  0.23  0.24  33% 
final products 0.61 0.70 0.80 0.83 0.92 1.13  1.04  1.14  1% 
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.   
As for footwear and furniture, the ratio of imported parts to total exports of footwear 
chain products fell from 38 percent in 2000-01 to 34 percent in 2003 and in exports of furniture 
from 23 percent in 1998 to 12 percent in 2003. Since in both networks this was accompanied by a 
quicker growth in exports of parts than of final products, this suggests that Bulgarian producers of 
are firmly embedded in EU-driven footwear and furniture chains. This also may suggest the   -  40  -     
emergence of backward linkages replacing imports with parts domestically produced. Both 
developments have positive spillovers. 
The shift towards specialization in furniture parts is indicative of Bulgaria’s overall 
progress in industrial restructuring following the pattern of earlier and more consistent reformers. 
Consider that while in 1995 only Slovenia, one of the most industrialized countries among 
CEEC-10 and important supplier to EU furniture producers already in the 1980s and to a lesser 
extent Hungary specialized in furniture parts, the situation changed already by 1999. For most 
CEEC-10 economies (except Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia), exports of parts increased more than 
exports of final products in 1999-2003 (Table 29). Furniture parts have also become the driver of 
furniture network exports for most countries including most recently Bulgaria. 
Table 29: Bulgaria’s involvement in furniture network in comparative perspective in 1996, 1999 
and 2003 
  Share in exports of  Share of parts in total  Import intensity  Exports (current US $) 
  manufactures (chemicals excl.) furniture network's exports (parts as % of  total  parts 
  (in percent)  (in percent )  network exports) Index, 2003  Index, 2003
  1996  1999  2003  1996 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999=100 1999=100 
Czech  R. 3.1  3.5  3.1  51 62 68 23 20  168  183 
Estonia  7.2  7.4  8.1  27 37 45 8      5  228  278 
Hungary  3.8  2.8  2.4  47 73 76 19 23  148  154 
Latvia  5.7  9.3  8.9  47 45 37   9 10  169  138 
Lithuania  3.5  5.8  9.2  18  36  27   9    6  383  292 
Poland  10.0 10.1  9.7  12 17 31   9 10  199  354 
Slovak  R. 3.8  2.4  4.8  14 36 24 30 25  461  310 
Slovenia  7.1  9.1  9.0  49 64 67 11 13  143  149 
Bulgaria  1.7  2.4  3.0  14 20 22 18 11  284  318 
Croatia  4.5  3.8  4.6  26 32 44 22 23  169  232 
Romania 9.0  6.9  5.8  3 10  16 3     5  184  296 
Albania  1.1  1.8  1.5  79 74 56  194    69  107    82 
Macedonia  0.5  1.0  0.6  23  17  17  22   43    74   74 
Moldova  4.2  1.5  0.5  2  50  37  58  112    69   52 
Serb&Mont  6.2  4.2  3.2  12 11 11 15      28  120  126 
Note: For Serbia and Montenegro the most recent data available are for 2002. 
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.   
Although the share of furniture network in Bulgaria’s exports of manufactured goods, 
excluding chemicals, remains low, it almost doubled between 1996 and 2003. Moreover, it is low 
only by standards of CEEC-8 and Romania but not in comparison to SEE economies except 
Serbia and Montenegro. However, in the latter, these exports have been falling since 1996. 
In all, developments in trade of ‘buyer-driven’ value chains seem to support the following 
observations: Respective industrial sectors in Bulgaria are not enclaves, but appear to be soundly 
immersed in the domestic economy. All of them have been very competitive in EU markets 
indicating significant progress in industrial restructuring. They have become part of global value 
chains, organized mainly by EU firms. 
B. ‘Producer-driven’ chains: automotive and information technology networks 
Despite huge differences, both ICT (information communication technology) and 
automotive sectors share an important characteristic; under the pressure of technological change 
released by Information Revolution “one stop shop” industrial structures have practically 
disappeared. Miniaturization, exponential growth in information processing and storage 
capacities combined with integration of Internet and imaging technologies have been the major 
driving forces behind transformation of both auto industry and ICT sectors worldwide over the 
last two decades. While several large MNCs coordinating production and marketing activities 
across the globe have traditionally dominated both sectors, MNCs in both of them have 
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either the disappearance or dramatic restructuring of global and vertically integrated firms. 
Thanks to new Internet technologies making possible to trace parts and components moving 
through chains of production spread over several countries and continents, vertically integrate 
firms have been replaced by supply chain structures connected through complex and borderless 
supply chains. These chains include not only product manufacturing but also the front-end 
customer contact and support services. They usually consist of several layers including parent 
companies, subsidiaries and subcontractors.  
Until recently Bulgaria had remained outside the EU-based ‘producer-driven’ networks. 
But in 2001-03 there were significant changes indicating entry of Bulgarian producers into supply 
chains of both networks. Although Bulgaria inherited industrial structure favoring specialization 
in ICT products rather then automotive ones,
20 automotive sectors accounted in 1996 for 85 
percent of total exports of producer-driven networks. ICT networks’ exports emerged as 
dominant in Bulgaria producer-driven networks’ exports first by default, i.e., automotive exports 
were falling faster than those of ICT products were until 2000, and subsequently thanks to 
stronger growth. Exports of ICT networks continued falling until 1999 and subsequently strongly 
rebounded (Table 30). So did exports automotive network, although they remained below their 
value in 1996. 
 Table 30: Total exports of producer-driven networks in 1996-2003 (in millions of US dollars) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
(in millions of US dollars)   
Exports of ICT Network products (in million of US dollars  20.6 19.8 14.2 13.3 16.7 21.4 27.1 45.5
Exports of Automotive Network  113.6 79.7 61.6 67.8 40.4  45.5 48.4 61.8
Total    134.2 99.5 75.8 81.1 57.1 66.9 75.5  107.3
Memorandum:  (in  percent)     
Share of IT network in total producer networks' exports  15.3 19.9 18.7 16.3 29.2  31.9  35.9  42.4
Share of the EU-25  51.0 44.6 57.4 65.0 58.3  56.8  46.4  66.4
of  which:  CEEC-8 14.4 17.1 14.7 9.9 9.6 8.5 6.5 7.5
Share  of  ROW  34.5 38.3 27.9 25.0 32.1 34.6 47.1 26.1
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.   
Post-1999 developments in Bulgaria’s trade in producer network products flag its return 
to trends prevailing in other CEEC-10 economies and worldwide. First, in line with worldwide 
trends, Bulgaria’s trade in ICT network products has displayed much stronger dynamics than that 
in automotive network. While the value of automotive exports stood still in 2003 at 54 percent of 
its peak level in 1996, but 50 percent above this level in 2000, the value of ICT exports was more 
than twice higher than in 1996 and more than three times higher than in 1999 (Table 30). 
 Second, Bulgarian firms have become increasingly integrated into EU-based networks of 
production and distribution but only during the 2000-03 period. Indeed, its earlier geographical 
patterns suggested continuation of former CMEA links even during the initial stages of transition 
in 1991-95, which, however, collapsed once reforms would begin taking hold in CIS economies. 
The emergence of hard-budget constraint and the shift in demand towards more sophisticated 
products crowded out Bulgarian suppliers. CIS imports accounted for 45 percent of Bulgarian 
exports of ICT network products in 1996, while the EU-15 together with CEEC-9 took only 28 
percent of them. Their aggregate share rose to 60 percent in 1999, with the value of Bulgarian 
exports around one-third higher than in 1996. In contrast, CIS-oriented exports collapsed in 1999. 
                                                           
20 In 1990 Bulgaria had a less developed automotive sector than in former Czechoslovakia or Poland, but its 
electrical equipment sector—one of the major players in ICT network trade—was as developed as that in 
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So did ICT total exports falling from US$ 21 million in 1996 to US$ 13 million or by US$ 8 
million, which is precisely the amount of the contraction in CIS-destined exports. Similar 
geographic reorientation can be discerned in automotive network trade, with the recovery in 
exports mainly due to the increase in EU and CEEC import demand (Table 31).  
Table 31: Trade with the EU in ‘producer-driven’ chains in 1996-2003 (in millions of US dollars 
and percent) 
   .  Change  in 
2003 over
Product  (SITC Revision 2)  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003  2000 
A. Automotive Network       
EU-oriented exports of final products and parts ($  million) 36.1 19.0 18.0 17.2 17.0 17.1 18.7 27.3  61% 
Share of parts in EU-destined network exports (%)  29.3 52.8 58.6 70.7 78.8 66.2  68.6  77.9  -1% 
Imports of parts ($ million)  45.7 35.8 41.3 44.7 46.2 47.1  66.6  76.7  66% 
Share of parts in network's imports (%)  22.2 23.9 18.6 20.6 20.9 16.7  19.4  14.8  -29% 
Imports of parts as % of  network's exports  (%)  126 188 230 260 271 276  357  281 4% 
Memo Items:       
Share of products and parts in Bulgaria's exports (%)  1.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5  0.6  0.6  0% 
Share of EU in total network's exports (%)  39.2 23.2 32.1 42.0 40.4 38.6  32.0  47.5  18% 
Share of new 2004 EU-8 in Bulgaria's exports of network 
products (%) 
16.5 20.6 21.3 16.8 16.3 12.7  10.7  13.3 -18% 
Share in EU15 external imports of network (%)  0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.03  0.03  50% 
of:  which  parts 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  0% 
final  products 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0% 
B. ICT Network       
EU-oriented exports of final products and parts ($  million) 8.3 11.1 19.0 24.1 23.1 22.2 31.3 55.1  139% 
Share of parts in total network exports (%)  61.2 37.9 34.1 32.1 53.4 67.0  57.3  33.4  -37% 
Imports of parts ($ million)  26.9 41.1 54.4 74.4 54.7 119  124  120  119% 
Share of parts in network's imports (%)  29.2 46.5 37.5 34.2 27.2 38.1  42.4  34.5  27% 
Imports of parts as % of  network's exports  (%)  323 369 286 309 237 535  395 217  -8% 
Memo Items:       
Share of products and parts in Bulgaria's total exports (%) 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.7  1.0  1.3  63% 
Share of EU-15 in Bulgaria's total network's exports (%)  28.4 40.6 62.1 70.9 57.3 59.8  46.9  66.8  17% 
Share of  CEEC-8 in exports of network products (%)  8.1 6.7 2.6 1.6 2.6 3.6 2.8 3.5  35% 
Share in EU15 external imports of network (%)  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02  0.02  0.03  200% 
of:  which  parts 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0% 
final  products 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02  100% 
C. Total 'Producer-Driven' value chains       
Share of above exports in Bulgaria's total exports (%)  2.0 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.3  1.5 1.9  36% 
Share of EU-15 in exports of networks (%)  36.6 27.5 42.7 55.1 48.7 48.3  39.9  58.9  21% 
Share of CEEC-8 in Bulgaria's exports of networks (%)  14.4 17.1 14.7 9.9 9.6 8.5  6.5  7.5  -22% 
Share in EU15 external imports of network (%)  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02  0.03  50% 
of  which:  parts 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02  100% 
final  products 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02  100% 
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.   
Third, in line with trends observed in other CEEC-10 economies (Kaminski 2004), there 
has been a shift towards specialization in automotive parts and ICT final products. Exports of the 
latter practically disappeared. While exports of motor vehicles accounted for 15 percent of 
automotive network’s EU-destined sales in 1996, this share fell to 2 percent in 2003. On the other 
hand, the share of other parts and accessories (SITC 7849) increased from 5 percent to 15 percent 
over this period. Exports of parts to EU-15 and CEEC-8 markets have driven the growth in 
automotive network exports in 2002-03. The share of parts increased from 69 percent in 2002 to 
78 percent in 2003 and the aggregate share of EU-15+CEEC-8 grew from 43 percent to 61 
percent of total automotive network exports in this period indicating entry of some Bulgarian 
firms into ‘pan-European’ chains of supply. 
While expanding demand in both EU-15 and CEEC-8 markets accounted for the 187 
percent increase in total ICT network’s exports in 2003, final products have become the major 
drivers of network’s exports. Their share in total network’s exports increased from 45 percent in   -  43  -     
2001 to 69 percent and in EU-oriented exports, accounting for 67 percent of Bulgaria’s ICT 
exports, from 33 percent in 2001 to 66 percent in 2003. More significantly, there was a huge 
change in the composition of ICT EU-oriented exports: three four-digit SITC sectors—
radiotelegraphic/ radiotelephonic products (7643), telecommunications equipment (7648),
21 and 
parts of apparatus—now accounting for three-fourth of ICT exports contributed only 33 percent 
in 1999. 
Last but not least, while import intensities of both networks remain very high indicating 
lack of significant assembly operations, they began falling in 2002-03. Based on network trade 
intensities of CEEC-10 that successfully have entered into supply chains, the value of the share of 
imports of parts in network’s exports of parts and final products below 100 percent suggests 
significant involvement in division of labor based on production fragmentation. 
Hence, despite a strong rebound and signs of entry of some firms, Bulgarian producers 
remain marginal suppliers in global ‘producer-driven’ networks. The share of networks’ products 
and parts in Bulgarian total exports remains low and reached its peak 1996 level only in 2003. 
Despite significant gains in EU markets, their shares in EU imports of both networks’ products 
are well beyond the share of total Bulgarian exports in total EU external imports. 
C. Bulgaria’s producer-driven network trade in regional perspective 
Hence, Bulgaria has a long way to catch up with most other CEEC-10 in terms of 
participation in ‘producer-driven’ network-based trade. The share of ‘producer-driven’ network 
products in total exports of manufactured goods, excluding chemicals, in 2003 puts it on a par 
with Latvia, and except for Serbia and Montenegro is much higher than in SEE-3 economies. It 
is, however, much lower than in Romania (Table 32). 
Table 32: Features of ‘producer-driven’ network trade of CEEC-10 and SEE-5 economies in 
1996, 1999 and 2003 (in percent) 
  Share in exports of manuf.  Exports (current US$) Share of parts in exports of  Share of ICT network
  (chemicals excl.)  total  parts  auto network ICT network  exports in 'producer-
    (in percent)  Average growth     driven'  exports 
  1996 1999 2003  2003-00  2000-03  1999  2003 1999  2003 1999  2003 
Czech  R.  18 24 34  22  21 47  57  56  26 13  36 
Estonia  22 28 30      1  16 52  45  58  54 80  72 
Hungary  13 52 54  11  10 71  79  30  21 52  58 
Latvia    7    3    5  27  13  62  56  57  25  58  61 
Lithuania  24 14 19  24  14 28  14  73  73 57  41 
Poland  13 19 26  16  22 41  66  40  42 30  22 
Slovak  R.  19 30 41  25  35 30  37  46  44 14  12 
Slovenia  21 21 22  10  14 37  47  35  25  9  12 
Bulgaria  8 5 4 24  24  66  60  49  41  28  64 
Croatia  7 5 8 16  14  96  84  37  49  33  61 
Romania  4  6  10  14  10  83 89 78 19  42  43 
Albania  0 3 2 41  97  21  73  10  54  47  57 
Macedonia  3  3  2    2    2  70  86  26  63  7  14 
Moldova  12  5  3  11  13  16 34 17 36  67  29 
Serbia & Mont  10  13  11  10  14  80  85  46  34    3    9 
Note: For Serbia and Montenegro the most recent data available are for 2002. 
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.   
Bulgaria fits neatly into two different patterns of specialization that appear to have been 
emerging in Central Europe since 2000. First, like most CEEC-10 economies that ‘plugged-in’ 
automotive networks, it has been moving towards specialization in automotive parts. While the 
share of parts in Bulgarian automotive exports was 66 percent in 1999, it fell to 44 percent in 
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2000 and continued its upward movement through 2001-03. This was not the case of only two 
other exceptions to the general trend of increasing significance of parts—Latvia and Lithuania. 
The share of parts was consistently falling through 1999-03 in spite of a 20 percent average 
annual growth per year over 2000-03. Exports of final products simply grew faster.  
Second, like most other CEEC-10 and SEE-participants of ICT networks, Bulgarian firms 
have been shifting towards specializing mostly in assembly operations. For most of them, the 
share of final products in ICT exports has significantly increased indicating the shift towards final 
production. Countries that succeeded in expanding exports of final products have also increased 
imports of IT parts. So has Bulgaria, which provides indications of the emergence of similar 
pattern of specialization in assembly operations. On the other hand, countries whose firms remain 
mostly outside ICT supply chains, i.e., from Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, tend to produce 
parts rather than final products. 
D. Other forms of outsourcing: exports of parts and other engineering products together with 
parts 
The ‘producer-driven’ network analysis, confined to immediate inputs and final products 
of IT and automotive products, does not capture all intra-product trade. Some additional insights 
into developments in this trade can be obtained by examining specialization patterns in Bulgaria’s 
trade with the EU in parts and engineering intermediate and final products not covered by 
network trade analysis. The list of products includes two groups: products defined explicitly as 
parts in four-digit SITC 7. Rev. 2 and SITC 8 (e.g., parts of clocks, cameras, and other optical 
equipment) hereafter referred to as ‘other parts;’ and ‘other parts and products’ including also 
machinery equipment products together with respective parts (e.g., hydraulic motors and parts, 
electrothermic appliances and parts).  
How does Bulgaria score on this count? Two observations can be derived from data 
reported in Table 33. First, EU-oriented exports of these products have recorded strong and 
steady growth since 1997. The value of exports of parts not covered by network analysis 
increased 4.2 times between 1997 and 2003; they grew at an average compound rate of 24 percent 
per year over this period; and their share in EU external imports increased 3.4 times from 0.08 
percent to 0.26 percent. If anything, this indicates the emergence of well-established commercial 
relations based on a stable participation in outsourcing by EU firms. 
Table 33: Exports of parts and other engineering products and their share in EU external imports and 
Bulgaria’s EU-oriented exports in 1996-2003 (in millions of US dollars and percent)  
              Change  2003 
  1996 1997 1998  1999  2000 2001 2002  2003    over  2001 
Parts not covered by networks  26.8 26.0 33.4 44.1 50.7 60.7 79.6  110.2  82% 
Other engineering products and parts  36.1 35.5 44.4 46.2 47.9 61.5 88.7  118.5  93% 
TOTAL ABOVE  62.9 61.5 77.8 90.3 98.6 122.2 168.3  228.7  87% 
Imports of parts as percent of exports  130 117 117 110 99 100 82  87  -13% 
Share in EU external imports   0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.12% 0.13% 0.17% 0.24%  0.29%  75% 
Share in Bulgaria’s EU-oriented exports  2.9% 2.6% 3.1% 3.8% 3.5% 3.9% 5.1%  5.4%  37% 
Source: Derived from EU trade data as reported to the UN COMTRADE database. 
Second, the 2001-03 period witnessed significant acceleration of exports of both parts 
and other engineering products together with parts. This has not been because of appreciation of 
Euro vis-à-vis US dollar, as the increase in the value of exports of 87 percent in 2003 over 2001 
accompanied a similar increase in Bulgaria’s share in EU-external imports increasing 75 percent 
over this time. These products have driven the recent expansion in Bulgaria’s EU-oriented 
exports, as their share in Bulgaria’s exports increased from 3.7 percent in 2000-01 to 5.4 percent 
in 2003.    -  45  -     
While it may be premature to make predictions, developments in this trade may indicate 
the future pattern of Bulgaria’s firms’ integration into EU and global markets—integration going 
beyond ICT and automotive networks but still involving sophisticated engineering products and 
stable commercial relations with major world producers.  
E. Concluding observations 
Although Bulgarian firms’ involvement in EU-based ‘buyer-driven’ global value chains 
still towers over ‘producer-driven’ networks and engineering products covered by EU-
outsourcing, there are clear signs of ongoing transformation as revealed in Bulgaria’s export 
basket. Bulgarian exports related to participation in global value chains account now for almost 
half of EU-oriented exports up from around one-third in 1996-97 (Table 34). ‘Buyer-driven’ 
exports accounted for 84 percent of these exports in 2003 down from an average of 88 percent in 
1997-2001. This share fell mainly due to the expansion in exports of other parts and engineering 
products. 
Table 34: Composition of EU-oriented exports of network products and other parts in 1996-2003 (in 
percent) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Buyer-driven'  networks  84.9 88.6 88.0 86.6 87.3 88.2 85.0 84.0 
of  which:  TC 66.3 69.0 71.9 70.8 72.4 72.6 68.3 67.4 
Producer-driven'  networks  6.3 3.7 3.9 4.2 3.7 2.9 3.4 4.2 
of  which:  ICT 1.2 1.4 2.0 2.4 2.1 1.6 2.2 2.8 
Other  parts  and  engineering  products  8.9 7.6 8.1 9.2 9.0 8.9  11.6  11.8 
Memorandum: Share in Bulgaria's EU-
oriented exports 
32.2 33.5 37.6 41.4 38.6 44.0 44.2 45.5 
Source: Derived from EU trade data as reported to the UN COMTRADE database. 
Although exports from ‘buyer-driven’ chains continued to grow faster than total EU-
oriented exports in both 1996-99 and 2000-03, two significant changes have been occurring. First, 
textiles and clothing ceased to be the levers of ‘buyer-driven’ exports in 2000-03, although their 
export growth—driven increasingly by textiles—has remained impressive at an average annual 
growth rate of 13 percent. Second, furniture was the most dynamic export in 2002-03. The share 
of T&C products in ‘buyer-driven’ network exports fell from 82 percent in 1998-2001 to 80 
percent in 2002-03 due to the surge in exports of furniture network products in 2002 and 2003. 
The share of furniture exports in total ‘buyer-driven’ networks’ exports grew from 4 percent in 
1997-2001 to 6 percent in 2002-03.  
Until recently Bulgaria had remained outside the EU-based ‘producer-driven’ networks. 
But in 2001-03 there were significant changes indicating entry of Bulgarian producers into supply 
chains of both networks. Bulgaria inherited industrial structure favoring specialization in ICT 
products rather then automotive ones,
22 yet automotive sectors accounted in 1996 for 85 percent 
of total exports of producer-driven networks. ICT networks’ exports emerged as dominant in 
Bulgaria producer-driven networks’ exports first by default, i.e., automotive exports were falling 
faster than those of ICT products were until 2000, and subsequently because of stronger growth. 
Exports of ICT networks continued falling until 1999. 
In all, the ongoing shift towards furniture (or more exactly furniture parts) within ‘buyer-
driven’ networks’ exports, towards ICT final products and automotive parts within ‘producer-
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electrical equipment sector—one of the major players in ICT network trade—was as developed as that in 
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driven’ exports and strong expansion of exports of other parts and engineering products point to 
significant progress in industrial restructuring and ensuing gains in competitiveness. 
6.  Foreign Direct Investment and Trade 
The empirical evidence on links between FDI and trade point not only to the 
complementary relationship between FDI and exports
23 but also to increasingly stronger links due 
to the growing fragmentation of production combined with the creation of distribution networks 
spanning across continents. Global diffusion of productive activity leads to an increased 
international trade in both final goods and parts and components. Thus, about one-third of world 
trade consists of intra-firm trade, that is trade among various parts of a single corporation, and the 
importance of intra-firm trade has been growing over time. Estimates also suggest that about two-
thirds of world trade in the latter half of the 1990s involved multinational corporations, including 
both intra-firm trade and arms-length transactions (UNCTAD 2002, p. 153). In consequence, the 
issue has become where firms locate their value added activities rather than whether FDI leads to 
trade or the other way around. 
A. Why limited impact in the 1990s? 
For Bulgaria, throughout most of the 1990s, the issue of links of FDI with trade was of 
little relevance for four reasons. First, Bulgaria—because of the combination of moratorium on 
private debt and rescheduling until the 1994 Club of London agreement resolved the rescheduling 
issue and unreformed economic regime—was not a significant recipient of FDI until 1997. In this 
year alone, the value of FDI of US$ 537 was 47 percent above the cumulative inflows in 1990-96, 
which on average amounted to US$ 68 per capita (Table 35). In all, 78 percent of cumulative FDI 
inflows over 1990-1999 came in 1997-99. Although FDI were on average above five percent of 
Bulgaria’s FDI in 1997-99, given lead times and their concentration in nontradables, they had 
limited impact on trade in this period. 
Table 35: FDI inflows to Bulgaria and CEEC-10 countries in 1991-96, 1997-1999 and 2000-2003 
  Average FDI (in millions 
of US dollars 
Average FDI per 
capita (in US 
dollars) 
FDI as a percent of 
average GDP in 


























Bulgaria 68  620  1,205  9 79 154 0.6 5.2 7.8 7,129  911  3.9
Czech  Republic 1,020 3,772 6,197  100 370 607 2.5 6.9 9.4 42,640  4,180  6.4
Estonia  132 339 477 98 251 354 3.2 6.8 7.4 3,735  2,767  5.7
Hungary  2,191 1,930 1,511  216 191 149 5.5 4.1 2.5 24,772  2,448  3.9
Latvia  117 406 327 50 175 141 2.2 6.6 4.0 3,323  1,432  4.0
Lithuania  32 580 530  9 168 153 0.4 5.5 3.8 4,137  1,198  3.1
Poland  1,644 4,880 5,799  43 128 152 1.6 3.0 3.1 50,551  1,323  2.7
Romania  194 1,432 1,122  9 65 51 0.6 3.8 2.4 10,017  451  2.1
Slovakia 153  386  2,475  29 72 460 1.0 1.8 10.2 12,104  2,249  4.8
Slovenia 96  241  1,107  49 123 564 0.6 1.3 5.1 5,817  2,962  2.5
TOTAL or 
average 
5,616 14,588 20,749  55 142 201 2.1 3.9 4.6 164,225  1,594  3.6
Memorandum: Bulgaria       
Percent of the 
average or total 
1.2 4.3 5.8  15.9 56.0 76.4 30.4 133 170 4.3  57.2  108
Source: various issues of Economic Survey for Europe (UN Economic Commission for Europe), EBRD Transition Reports 
and World Development Indicators 2003. 
Second, one has significant doubts whether foreign trade considerations were behind 
significant portion of FDI inflows especially in 1998-99. The share of FDI originating in highly 
developed OECD economies fell to 56 percent and 50 percent of total annual inflows in this 
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period, whereas the share of Cyprus rose to 24 percent and 20 percent in respective years. Cyprus 
was by far the largest investor in 1998 (US$ 131 million), with the US distant second (US$ 50 
million). In 1999 investments originating in Cyprus amounted to US$ 162 million well above the 
second Holland with US$ 106 million and third Russia with US$ 100 million. On the one hand, 
this was a positive development signaling the reversal of capital flight in response to the 
improvements in business climate. On the other hand, however, considering the local expertise of 
investors, these were probably mostly investments targeting domestic markets or already well 
established external ones. 
Third, FDI going to sectors producing tradable goods (agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing) accounted for a relatively low share of the total FDI. In terms of FDI cumulative 
over 1998-2003 sectors producing tradable goods attracted 26 percent of total FDI inflows in this 
period (Table 36). In contrast, manufacturing alone accounted for almost half of FDI inflows to 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Services sectors have attracted almost two thirds of total inflows. 
The most prominent among them was the banking sector almost completely wiped out in years 
preceding the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1996.  
Table 36: Sectoral composition of FDI flows in 1998-2003 (in percent) 
                     Cumulative 
    1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  1998-2003 2000-2003 
Tradable  goods  sectors  35.3 53.7 19.9 31.7  9.7  18.4  26.1  19.5 
Of  which:  manufacturing 34.1 53.5 17.9 31.0  8.4  18.2  25.3  18.5 
Services:  58.4 37.7 72.5 60.8 72.6  70.2  63.6  69.4 
Of  which  financial  sector 28.0 11.9 44.9 15.1 14.8  34.6  26.3  28.9 
Others  6.3 8.7 7.6 7.5  17.7 11.4  10.3  11.1 
TOTAL  100 100 100 100 100  100  100  100 
Source: BNB and WB staff calculations. 
Last but not least, the time needed to establish a viable export operation was probably 
longer in the late 1990s than it would have been during the initial stages of transition in Bulgaria 
had Bulgaria stayed the reform course as other early radical reformers of Central Europe. 
Although with the change of government in 1997, triggered by the financial crisis of 1996, 
Bulgaria’s path of transformation converged to that shared by most advanced reformers, initial 
opportunities were irreversibly squandered. For instance, a good example of opportunities that 
were either lost or subsequently could not be tapped relatively quickly is electrical engineering 
and computers. Products of electrical engineering and electronics industry in total exports 
accounted for 28 percent in 1989. Without FDI inflows to provide access to quickly evolving 
technologies and effect restructuring, the chance of their survival in truly competitive markets 
was practically nonexistent. Thanks to FDI, this sector survived and expanded in CEEC-10, in 
particular Hungary, but stagnated and devolved in Bulgaria (Zsanyi 2004).  
But there are multiple signs pointing to the reversal in industrial devolution including 
electrical engineering. First, FDI accounted in 1998-2003 for between 25 percent and 48 percent 
of Bulgaria’s Gross Domestic Investment (Table 37). On average, more than one third of total 
investments in the Bulgarian economy were foreign investments in 2000-03. As mentioned 
earlier, in contrast to FDI inflows in 1998-1999, these came mainly from highly developed 
countries. A recent surge of high quality FDI inflows into sectors of the Bulgarian economy—
both services and manufacturing—that are critical to integration into pan-European markets for 
higher value added products. 
Second, the share of Gross Domestic Investment in GDP significantly increased over 
1998-2003. So did the share of FDI in 2001-2003 increasing to almost 50 percent in 2003. On 
average in 2000-03, foreign investments in manufacturing amounted to 1.4 percent of the GDP. 
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strong potential for exports. 
Table 37: Share of Gross Domestic and Foreign Direct Investment in GDP in 1998-2003 (in percent) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average 2000-03
Gross Domestic Investment  16.9 17.9 18.3 20.7 19.8 21.7 20.1 
Foreign Direct Investment , net  4.2 6.2 8.0 5.9 5.8 10.4 7.5 
of which: manufacturing  1.4 3.3 1.4 1.8 0.5 1.9 1.4 
Share of FDI in Gross Domestic Investment  25.0 34.8 43.9 28.4 29.0 47.8 37.3 
Source: BNB and WB staff calculations. 
Last but not least, while we do not have data that would allow linking exports with 
companies according to their ownership, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that FDI have 
been responsible for recent changes in Bulgaria’s export mix. 
B. Lesson from other transition economies: reason for optimism with a caveat 
The experience of CEEC economies provides strong support to this observation. All these 
economies share at least one characteristic—they all have been well endowed in skilled labor 
force. So has been Bulgaria. But its export pattern of factor content intensities was different, with 
unskilled labor intensive products towering other products since 1997. While expansion in 
exports of unskilled labor intensive products has characterized the adjustment in foreign trade 
flows following the implementation of stabilization-cum-transformation programs in other CEEC 
economies, subsequently, however, the gap between endowment in skilled labor and its absence 
in exported goods was closed. FDI flows have played critical role in it.  
Indeed, exports from transition economies with higher cumulative inflows of FDI per 
capita tend to have larger share of manufactures in total exports and are part of flows within EU-
based production and distribution networks. The value of correlation coefficient between 
cumulative FDI per capita and the share of manufactures in exports of CEEC-11 and SEE-5 is 
positive and high at 79.4 percent. Furthermore, their exports are more oriented towards skilled 
labor and capital intensive products. Again the share of these products in manufactured exports 
grows as cumulative FDI per capita increases, with the correlation of 79.1 percent. Similarly high 
correlation is between the level of FDI stock per capita and the participation of domestic 
companies in ‘producer-driven’ global networks. This comes as no surprise, as production in 
supply chains of these networks is both capital and skilled labor intensive. 
The experience of other transition economies point not to one but two lessons. The first is 
that FDI flows into Bulgaria will be contributing to closing of the gap in factor content. The 
second lesson is the critical importance of sustaining structural reform effort (Kaminski 2005). 
C. Signs of change? 
Hence, if the experience of other transition economies is relevant, and there is no reason 
to argue otherwise, then one may expect significant increase in FDI-driven exports in the coming 
years, if not already in 2004-05. Inflows over 2000-03, amounting on average to almost 8 percent 
of the GDP, were large by any standards, albeit lower than into Czech Republic and Slovakia in 
the same period (see Table 35 above).  
In fact, even though the share of FDI going directly to manufacturing in total FDI fell 
from 46 percent in 1998-99 to 20 percent in 2000-03, this should not suggest that they will have 
little impact on Bulgaria’s trade. For starters, consider that the origins of these inflows in 1998-99 
raise concern as to their quality. Second, note that these flows accounted on average for almost 2 
percent of the GDP in that period. These are significant amounts similar in terms of GDP as those 
that went to Hungary or Poland in the 1990s. In both countries, export response came three-four 
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Furthermore, Bulgaria’s services sectors critical to the establishment of environment 
facilitating business operations and trade have attracted very significant amounts of FDI. In 2000-
03 the banking sector attracted the total of US$ 1.2 billion and transport and communication US$ 
691 million. These two sectors accounted for almost of total FDI inflows over 2000-03. With 
such an extensive foreign presence, the quality of services offered has correspondingly improved. 
As was argued earlier, there are signs indicating the transformation of Bulgaria’s export 
offer. Although the pattern of specialization that emerged in 1997-99 has largely continued 
through 2000-03, there has been perceptible movement towards capital- and skilled labor-
intensive products. Exports of electrical machinery have begun emerging as the top performers in 
world markets. One expects them to remain drivers of Bulgaria’s EU-oriented exports in the 
coming years provided there is no significant change in commitment to reforms and sound 
policies.   
7. Conclusions 
The main results of the empirical analysis of industrial restructuring as captured in 
foreign trade may be summarized as follows: 
⇒  Although the pattern of specialization in unskilled labor intensive, low technology products 
largely continued through 2000-03, there are indications of the ongoing shift towards patterns 
typical of more developed CEEC-8 countries with similar endowments in production factors. 
⇒  Changes in import demand and export offer suggest that the process of industrial 
restructuring has at last begun.  
o  The share of manufactures in Bulgaria’s trade has not only significantly 
increased but, within manufactures, there has been the shift towards products 
with higher technology content and capital goods.  
o  The fall in the share of traditional inputs, i.e., products used for further 
processing, in Bulgaria’s exports has been accompanied by a marked increase in 
the share of machinery. This, combined with the increase of more technologically 
advanced manufactures in Bulgaria’s exports, suggests a gradual shift towards 
more processed exports. 
o  New exports come mainly from restructured industrial capacities auguring well 
for future competitiveness in international markets. Recent star performers in 
EU-15 markets, now accounting for 16 percent of Bulgaria’s exports up from 4 
percent in 2000, are mainly electro-engineering products. Exports of machinery 
top the list, contributing almost 40 percent to the total of top performers’ exports.  
 
⇒  The process of realignment in allocation of resources in response to economic opening 
offered European markets as well as Bulgaria’s potential comparative advantage in skilled 
labor intensive products has begun impacting Bulgaria’s export basket.  
o  While 1996-2000 witnessed little or no gains in overall competitiveness of 
Bulgarian producers in world markets, except for clothing mainly in EU markets, 
there was a significant increase in the presence of Bulgarian exporters in the most 
recent period, especially in 2003.  
o  Capital and labor have been moving to more sophisticated and higher value 
added activities and more processed goods with higher content of capital and 
skilled labor have been expanding faster than traditional inputs and unskilled 
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o  The gap between CEEC-8 economies and Bulgaria in terms of export 
performance and its factor embodiments appears to be closing, albeit slowly, as 
exports of capital- and skilled-labor intensive products have begun growing. 
o  Among emerging fast growers, i.e., products whose exports growth exceeded 
annual changes in EU import demand by at least 30 percent in 2000-03, capital 
intensive products have stood out.  
⇒  While overall Bulgaria has a long way to catch up with other CEEC-10 economies in terms of 
participating in “producer-driven” network trade, there were healthy symptoms of growth in 
2001-03.  
⇒  The ongoing shift towards furniture (or more exactly furniture parts) within ‘buyer-driven’ 
networks’ exports, ICT final products and automotive parts within ‘producer-driven’ exports 
and strong expansion of exports of other parts and engineering products point to significant 
progress in industrial restructuring and ensuing gains in competitiveness. Although Bulgarian 
producers have not yet become part on any significant scale of the division of labor based on 
production fragmentation in vertically integrated sectors, they have made significant strides 
in information communication technology products and automotive parts. 
⇒  The returns usually associated with liberal reforms, i.e., gains in competitiveness combined 
with shift towards in products in line with country’s endowments in production factors began 
to surface only recently. In contrast to the period preceding the second transformational 
recession, gains in competitiveness derive from corporate and industrial restructuring and not 
from subsidies. 
⇒  Growing presence of foreign-owned firms and significant penetration by foreign capital of 
services sectors augurs well for export-oriented restructuring of the Bulgarian economy. 
While this paper has not directly addressed barriers stemming from weaknesses in the 
regulatory environment as it pertains to conducting business and assuring smooth functioning of 
services links indispensable for participation in global division of labor based on production 
fragmentation, the challenge facing policy makers boils down to removing various barriers that 
still prevent moving to higher value added integration into pan-European markets. Ultimately, 
whether positive changes observed during the current phase of export expansion will continue 
hinges critically on staying the reform course. 
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